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ABSTRACT
The use of equity-based compensation for employees in the lower ranks of large organizations is a
puzzle for standard economic theory: undiversified employees should discount company equity
heavily, and any positive incentive effects should be diminished by free rider problems. We analyze
whether the popularity of option compensation for rank and file employees may be driven by
employee optimism. We develop a model of optimal compensation policy for a firm faced with
employees with positive or negative sentiment, and explicitly take into account that current and
potential employees are able to purchase equity in the firm through the stock market. We show that
employee optimism by itself is insufficient to make equity compensation optimal for the firm. Any
behavioral  explanation  for  equity  compensation  based  on  employee  optimism  requires  two
ingredients: first, employees need be over-optimistic about firm value, and second, firms must be
able to extract part of the implied rents even though employees can purchase company equity in the
market. Such rent extraction becomes feasible if employees prefer the non-traded compensation
options offered by firms to the traded equity offered by the market, or if the traded equity is
overvalued. We then provide empirical evidence confirming that firms use broad-based option
compensation when boundedly rational employees are likely to be excessively optimistic about
company stock, and when employees are likely to have a strict preference for options over stock.
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1. Introduction 
 
The use of equity-based compensation for employees below the executive rank has been growing rapidly 
during the last decade, with broad stock option plans as the most common method. The National Center 
for Employee Ownership (2001) estimates that between 7 and 10 million US employees held options in 
2000.
  The  popularity  of  equity-based  compensation  for  employees  in  the  lower  ranks  of  large 
organizations  is  a  puzzle  for  standard  economic  theory:  any  positive  incentive  effects  should  be 
diminished  by  free  rider  problems  and  overshadowed  by  the  cost  of  imposing  risk  on  employees.
4 
Holding stock options in their employer exposes employees to price risk which is highly correlated with 
their human capital.
5 Hence employees should be an inefficient source of capital, at least compared to 
well-diversified outside investors.  
 
Several  studies  show,  however,  that  employees  do  not  value  company  stock  and  options  as 
prescribed by extant theory. For example, employees purchase company stock at market prices for their 
401(k) and ESOP plans on a large scale, and especially so after company stock has performed well.
6 In 
any  portfolio  selection  framework,  this  observation  strongly  suggests  that  employees’  valuation  of 
company stock is higher than the prevailing market price. With regard to stock options, survey evidence 
suggests that many employees have unrealistic expectations about future stock prices and frequently value 
their options substantially above Black-Scholes values.
7 Motivated by these observations, we analyze  
whether the popularity of option compensation for rank and file employees in large firms may be driven 
by employee optimism about their employers.
8 
 
We develop a model of optimal compensation policy for a firm faced with employees that exhibit 
either positive or negative sentiment towards it. We assess the circumstances under which employee 
optimism leads to equity-based compensation, and show that employee optimism by itself is insufficient 
to make equity compensation optimal for the firm. The crucial insight is that firms compete with financial 
markets as suppliers of equity to employees; the ability of employees to purchase equity on their own 
restricts firms’ capacity to profit from employees’ optimism, and hence restricts or even eliminates firms’ 
incentive to compensate with equity. Indeed, employee optimism about traded firm equity is sufficient to 
                                                            
4 See Core and Guay (2001) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005), as well as Lazear (1999).  
5 In the remainder of the paper we use the term “employees” as equivalent to “non-executive employees”. 
6 See Benartzi (2001), Liang and Weisbenner (2002), and Huberman and Sengmüller (2004). 
7 See Lambert and Larcker (2001) and Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2005).  
8 The behavioral finance literature suggests that employees are more likely to be optimistic about their firm than 
other investors in the equity market: Employees may “root for the home team” and feel loyalty towards their   3 
make firms indifferent between paying their employees in equity or cash, but it is insufficient, by itself, to 
force firms away from cash wages. Firms could simply pay employees a cash amount equal to the market 
value of the desired equity, and leave the decision whether to purchase equity up to the employees. 
 
We find that any behavioral explanation for equity compensation based on employee optimism 
requires two ingredients: first, employees need be over-optimistic about firm value, and second, firms 
must be able to extract part of the rents created by the overvaluation even though employees can purchase 
company equity in the market. This second requirement is crucial as, although employees may greatly 
overvalue company stock, the firm  may be unable to appropriate any of the associated rents simply 
because employees can purchase bets on firm value by themselves.  
 
The model analysis further shows that the feasibility and magnitude of firms’ rent extraction is 
determined by employees’ willingness to pay for equity compensation – that is, the cash wages that 
employees are willing to give up in return for the equity compensation – rather than by employees’ 
optimistic valuations of the compensation instruments. This willingness to pay is determined in part by 
what employees can purchase in the equity market. For example, if employees perceive that the stock 
market offers bets on the firm equivalent to the equity compensation which they are being offered by 
firms, then regardless of their degree of optimism, their willingness to pay for equity compensation is no 
greater than its market price.  
 
Our  model  presents  two  channels  which  make  employees  willing  to  overpay  for  equity 
compensation, thereby lowering compensation costs, and causing equity compensation to become optimal 
from the firm’s perspective. The first channel is operative if employees, for behavioral or rational reasons, 
prefer a non-traded compensation instrument to a position in traded equity of similar fundamental value. 
In this case, as monopoly suppliers of the compensation instrument, firms are able to profitably extract the 
implied valuation premium from their employees. Put differently, employees’ willingness to pay for the 
non-traded compensation instrument will reflect, in part, their preference for the non-traded compensation 
instrument over traded equity, and hence their willingness to pay may exceed fundamental value. 
 
This first channel requires that employees view the compensation instruments offered by firms as 
superior to the equity offered by the market, even if fundamental values are the same. Comparing non-
traded  compensation  instruments  to  traded  equity  is  more  difficult  for  employees  when  firms  offer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employer (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988), Cohen (2004)), and employees’ familiarity with their employer may 
increase their valuations for employer equity (Huberman (2001)).     4 
options, since rational option valuation on the basis of observed stock prices and volatilities is difficult 
and beyond the capabilities of most employees. Instead, employees are likely to rely on heuristics and to 
value options on the basis of their own or their peers’ past experience with option payoffs. When looking 
for alternative methods for investing in their employer, many employees are likely to simply compare the 
options offered by the firm to traded shares, which are the most salient alternative offered by the market, 
and  then  use  their  valuation  heuristics  to  decide  which  of  the  two  assets  they  prefer.
9  When  these 
valuation heuristics lead employees to prefer options over traded shares, the first channel is operative and 
option compensation becomes optimal for firms.
 10 
 
The second channel which makes paying optimistic employees with traded or non-traded equity 
optimal comes into effect when the equity is overvalued by the market. If employees are sufficiently 
optimistic about firm value, their willingness to pay for traded equity equals the market price of equity. 
Thus, overpriced equity can make equity compensation optimal for firms, as firms are able to profit by 
effectively selling overvalued equity to their employees. Firms become on the margin indifferent between 
paying  their  employees  with  equity,  and  issuing  overvalued  equity  directly  into  the  market.
11  With 
overvaluation, this is profitable even if the price the firm is able to charge is no higher than the prevailing 
market price.  
 
Next, the model allows us to analyze the effects of sentiment-induced equity compensation on firm 
profitability and labor market outcomes. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, positive employee sentiment is 
not always beneficial to the firm subject to it. Because employees’ human capital covaries positively with 
stock returns, optimistic employees may decide to work at a different firm while still investing in the one 
they are optimistic about, thereby avoiding the positive correlation between labor income and financial 
wealth.  If  firm-specific  human  capital  risk  is  a  serious  problem,  and  if  the  equity  market  is  highly 
                                                            
9 Exchange-traded short-term options are available for a subset of firms, but most employees are unlikely to be 
aware of this.  
10 Besides bounded rationality, there may be other reasons for employees to strictly prefer the compensation 
instruments offered by firms to traded equity. Employees may prefer a levered, option-like position in their 
employer and may face borrowing constraints. Alternatively, transaction costs of trading in the stock market may 
make the provision of options by the firm more efficient than purchases of equity by employees in the market. 
Transaction costs can give an advantage to firms paying with equity, even though this advantage is arguably too 
small to explain the massive increases in salary required in non-sentiment firms to retain their employees (Snider, 
2000). 
11 If firms face downward-sloping demand curves for their shares in the market, and employees are subject to an 
endowment effect (so that once granted shares they do not sell them, even though they would not have gone out and 
purchased any by themselves), then paying optimistic employees with shares may be cheaper than issuing equity 
into the market (Baker, Coval, and Stein (2004)). Alternatively, transaction costs associated with seasoned equity 
issues (Smith (1986), Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996), and Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000)) may make paying   5 
efficient,  this  mechanism  can  make  firms  without  positive  sentiment  the  beneficiaries  of  positive 
sentiment towards other firms, both in terms of profitability and in terms of firm size. On the other hand, 
the model shows that firms subject to positive sentiment are the net beneficiaries of equity compensation 
if their employees exhibit a significant preference for non-traded compensation instruments over traded 
stock and the level of firm-specific human capital risk is moderate, or when equity markets are inefficient. 
The stock option boom of the late 1990s can thus be interpreted as a situation in which firms subject to 
both positive employee sentiment and overvalued equity benefited through lower compensation costs, a 
larger number of employees, and higher profits.  
 
With the theoretical foundation for the use of equity compensation in place, we empirically test 
whether  the  observable  cross-sectional  and  time-series  patterns  of  broad-based  option  grants  are 
consistent with the hypothesis that option compensation is driven by employee sentiment. Our model 
predicts  that  option  compensation  is  used  when  employees  are  optimistic  about  options,  and  when 
employees  strictly  prefer  (non-traded)  options  to  the  equity  instruments  available  in  the  market.  To 
empirically assess this prediction, we utilize prior literature suggesting that employee sentiment towards 
their employer improves with prior stock price performance. In addition, due to the amplified nature of 
option payoffs, we expect boundedly rational employees to extrapolate more strongly from past returns 
when valuing options than when valuing stock. Thus, as past stock price performance increases, both 
employee  sentiment  and  employees’  preference  for  options  over  traded  equity  increase.  Our  model 
therefore  predicts  that  better  stock  price  performance  is  associated  with  greater  use  of  stock  option 
compensation.  We  make  use  of  the  psychology  literature  on  expectation  formation  and  excessive 
extrapolation  to  develop  additional  testable  hypotheses  relating  stock  return  patterns  and  firm 
characteristics to employee sentiment and stock option compensation. All hypotheses are developed in 
detail in Section 4. 
 
 Figure  1  gives  a  first  graphical impression  of  the evolution  of  employee  option  grants in our 
sample of 2,171 publicly traded firms from 1992 to 2003. The graph provides some prima facie evidence 
in support of the sentiment hypothesis: in close parallel with stock market valuations, per employee 
option grants started to rise rapidly in the mid 1990s, peaked in 2000, and dropped by approximately 60% 
over the subsequent three years. Using regression analysis, we show that the predictions of the employee 
sentiment hypothesis are strongly confirmed by both the cross-sectional and the time series evidence. 
Option compensation for non-executive employees is most common among firms with excellent prior 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
optimistic employees with equity cheaper than issuing equity into the market (Core and Guay (2001), Fama and 
French (2003)).    6 
stock price performance: the average prior two-year return for companies with granting activity in the 
bottom quintile is 7% per annum, compared to 30% p.a. for firms in the top quintile.
12 Sorting firms by 
prior year returns yields average (median) grants of $21,155 ($2,838) among firms in the top return 
quintile compared to only $7,850 ($1,116) among firms in the bottom return quintile. Consistent with 
Griffin and Tversky (1992), the effect of past returns on granting activity is non-linear, with granting 
activity concentrated among the very best prior performers. Consistent with Benartzi (2001), the positive 
relationship between stock returns and option grants becomes stronger when we enlarge the window over 
which past returns are measured. In addition, distressed firms which are about to delist for performance 
reasons  use  fewer  options,  suggesting  that  bad  sentiment  prevents  these  firms  from  using  option 
compensation to conserve on cash. Finally, firms which grant more options have faster employment 
growth than firms which use fewer or no options, consistent with the predictions of our model. 
  
Next,  we  test  the  model  prediction  that  firms  are  more  likely  to  pay  with  options  when  top 
executives view their own stock as overvalued. We identify situations in which company leaders are 
likely to view their firm’s stock price as too high by looking at firms in which managers have manipulated 
earnings and at firms in which top managers sell large amounts of company equity. We measure earnings 
manipulation  using  several  versions  of  the  modified  Jones  model  and  find  that  firms  likely  to  have 
manipulated  earnings  upwards  grant  between  13%  and  23%  more  options  than  firms  with  no 
manipulation. The insider trading results indicate that firms in which the top five managers cash out grant 
11% to 19% more options to their employees than comparable firms, while firms in which top managers 
purchase equity for their own accounts grant 17% to 19% less. The last result, however, is not robust to 
the inclusion of firm fixed effects, leaving us with mixed evidence for the relationship between executive 
trading and employee option compensation.  
 
We examine share repurchase decisions by option granting firms to provide further evidence on 
executives’ beliefs on equity mispricing.
13 If top executives view their own stock price as too high, they 
should be reluctant to repurchase shares at market prices, and should instead consider issuing new shares 
into the market. The results show that a sizeable subset of the heaviest option granters in our sample are 
also  active  repurchasers  of  company  equity,  rendering  it  unlikely  that  market  prices  are  viewed  as 
substantially  overvalued  by  top  executives.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  a  perception  of  equity 
                                                            
12 We define non-executive employees as all employees except the five most highly paid executives identified in the 
proxy statement. This definition is used by several studies (Core and Guay, (2001); Desai (2002)) and is imposed by 
the available data. See section 5 for an extensive discussion. 
13 The result that share repurchases are empirically linked to employee option programs has been documented by, 
among others, Weisbenner (2000), Kahle (2001), and Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003).   7 
overvaluation by these firms’ top executives does not explain their employee option programs. In the 
framework  of  our  model,  and  consistent  with  the  empirical  evidence  above,  this  leaves  employees’ 
preference for options over traded equity as a driving force behind option compensation. 
 
Finally,  our  empirical  results  provide  evidence  against  the  hypothesis  that  firms  with  cash 
constraints use option compensation in order to minimize cash payouts.
14 Core and Guay (2001) argue 
that  equity  compensation is  efficient if firms  need  to  raise  cash  and  if  the  information  asymmetries 
between  firms  and  their  employees  are  smaller  than  those  between  firms  and  outside  investors.  We 
therefore control for several measures of cash constraints in our empirical analysis. We find that option 
grants are strongly positively associated with corporate cash balances and contemporaneous cash flows, 
and negatively related to cash outflows for debt service (interest burden, leverage). These findings cast 
doubt on the hypotheses that option grants are motivated by asymmetric information and cash constraints. 
Instead, the results are again supportive of the idea that employee sentiment determines the ability of 
firms to compensate their employees with equity: employees are likely to display more positive sentiment 
towards firms with higher cash balances, higher levels of investment, and better investment opportunities, 
and  worse  sentiment  towards  firms  with  higher  levels  of  debt  and  higher  interest  payments.  This 
interpretation also helps to explain Fama and French’s (2005) observation that many fast-growing and 
highly profitable firms issue equity to employees every year, in apparent contradiction to the Myers-
Majluf (1984) pecking order theory: We propose that equity based compensation is not driven by firms’ 
intention to raise funds, but instead by exuberant employees who wish to be paid with options.  
 
Beyond our own empirical results, our model can explain several other empirical regularities. The 
equilibrium of the model is consistent with the survey evidence of Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) 
that firms need to compensate with options in order to attract and retain employees. Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence from the dot-com era supports the model prediction that an improvement in employee sentiment 
towards a firm can lead to a reduction in employment and an increase in compensation in its competitors: 
Snider (2000) reports that top law firms were forced to massively increase the salaries for associates to 
prevent  them  from  leaving  to  internet  start-ups  offering  equity-based  compensation.  In  addition,  our 
model is consistent with the empirical dominance of options over restricted stock as employees are more 
likely to overpay for options given that a close substitute to restricted stock is traded in the market.
15  
 
                                                            
14 See, for example, Yermack (1995), Dechow et al. (1996), and Core and Guay (2001). 
15  The greater popularity of options compared to stock is usually attributed to their favorable accounting treatment 
(Murphy (2002)).   8 
Our paper is not the first to consider employee sentiment as a factor in option compensation. The 
paper closest to our model is by Oyer and Schaefer (2005), who perform a calibration exercise to assess 
the effect of optimism about future returns on employees’ relative valuations of stock and options. In 
addition to the novel empirical evidence presented here, the main difference in our approach is that their 
analysis does not consider employees’ ability to purchase equity in the market. Our model shows that 
financial markets put a crucial constraint on firms’ ability to extract rents from employees, and that 
employees’ relative valuations for stock and options are of only secondary importance. Our analysis 
differs further from Oyer and Schaefer in that we explicitly model the effect of employee sentiment on 
labor market equilibria, taking into account firm-specific human capital risk and allowing for equity to be 
mispriced by the market.    
 
In the next section we present a simple model of optimal employee compensation when employees 
display sentiment towards firms. We defer a detailed review of the prior literature on employee option 
plans and on employees’ psychological biases until section 3. Section 4 translates the model and the prior 
literature on the formation of employee sentiment into testable predictions. Section 5 describes the data 




2. A Simple Model of Optimal Compensation 
 
We develop a simple one-period model in which two firm compete in the labor market and compensate 
their employees using cash and equity instruments. Both firms are assumed to be large, so that equity 
compensation has no effect on employees’ incentives to exert effort. The two firms, indexed by 1 and 2, 
have identical production functions using labor  1 l  and  2 l  as sole input to produce output G1 and G2, with 
Gi = f(li), and f(0) = 0, f’ > 0, f’(0) = ￿, and f’’ < 0. The two firms hire employees in a competitive labor 
market, each offering a compensation contract consisting of  i W  in cash wage, Ni units of traded company 
equity, and Mi units of a non-traded equity compensation instrument.  
 
The sole, but crucial, difference between the two equity instruments offered by firms is that one is 
traded in the equity market and can be purchased by employees, while the other is not traded and offered 
by  the  firms  only.  We  call  the  former  simply  “traded  equity”  and  the  latter  the  “non-traded  equity 
compensation instrument”. The assumption that each firm competes with the market in offering traded   9 
equity, while being, in essence, a monopoly supplier of its own compensation instrument, will drive much 
of the model results. To emphasize the fundamental equivalence of the two forms of equity in our model, 
aside from their differing tradability, we assume that for each firm, the payoff of a unit of the traded and 
of the non-traded equity is identical and given by the random  variable  i X
~
 (i  Î {1,2}), with mean 
normalized to 1 and variance 
2 s .  Thus, our results are not driven by different payoff structures of the 
two instruments. We assume for simplicity that the equity payoffs of the two firms are independent of 
each other, and that the number of equity instruments to be issued is small relative to the number of equity 
instruments  outstanding  so  that  the  expected  payoff  to  an  instrument  does  not  change  when  more 
instruments are issued.
16 The equity market is risk neutral with a riskless interest rate of zero, which 
implies that the fair market value of a unit of traded or non-traded equity of either firm is equal to 1.  
 
There is a homogeneous mass of potential employees which we normalize to 1. Employees are risk-
averse with mean-variance preferences and have a reservation wage of zero. We assume that potential 
employees display sentiment with regard to the expected payoffs to the equity instruments of firm 1. 
Parameterizing employee sentiment by s, employees believe the payoff of a unit of traded equity to 
be s X + 1
~
, and the payoff of a unit of the non-traded compensation instrument to be ) (
~
1 s z X + , with z’ 
greater than 0. Thus, we assume that employees do not necessarily recognize the fundamental equivalence 
in payoffs between the non-traded compensation instrument and traded equity, and allow employees to 
exhibit differing sentiment towards each.
17 
  
Whether  employees  prefer  the  non-traded  compensation  instrument  to  traded  equity,  and  the 
determinants of any preference for one over the other, are ultimately empirical questions, and we consider 
both possibilities (i.e. s ￿ z and s < z) in the analysis below. We motivate the assumption that employees 
may not recognize the equivalence between traded equity and the non-traded compensation instrument by 
the observation that most employees are completely unfamiliar with asset pricing techniques. Deriving the 
value of a non-traded compensation instrument from the observed prices and volatilities of traded equity 
is potentially difficult and beyond the abilities of employees. Instead, employees are likely to value the 
non-traded compensation instrument using simple heuristics such as experienced past payoffs.
18 This may 
                                                            
16 This assumption of infinitesimal dilution is similar in spirit to the “infinitesimal new loans” assumption in Stein 
(1998). 
17 At the cost of some complexity, we could assume that the traded equity and the non-traded compensation 
instrument have differing payoffs, and allow employees to exhibit different sentiment towards each. Doing so yields 
similar conclusions.  
18 See for example Benartzi (2001) and the discussion in Section 4.   10 
lead employees to prefer, for example, non-traded employee options to traded shares after a period with 
high stock (and even higher option) returns.   
 
In contrast to firm 1, potential employees do not display sentiment towards firm 2. We think of firm 
1 as operating in a “new economy” industry subject to sentiment and fads, and of firm 2 as operating in an 
“old economy” industry for which sentiment plays no role. Modeling two firms with non-zero sentiment 
does not change the results, but greatly complicates the exposition
 . Similarly, the modeling assumption 
that  the  traded  and  non-traded  equity  instruments  are  identical  and  linear  claims  is  a  convenient 
simplification; assuming instead that the non-traded compensation instrument is, for example, an option-
like claim and replacing the traded equity by employees’ preferred trading strategy would deliver similar 
results.  In  this  context,  the  difference  in  sentiment  between  traded  equity  and  the  non-traded 
compensation instrument would measure whether employees prefer the compensation instrument to the 
best asset or trading strategy the employees are able to identify in the market.
19 
 
The model takes into account that employees bear risk associated with firm-specific human capital 
correlated with the equity values of their employer. When working for firm i, employees obtain implicit 
random compensation i Y
~
, with mean 0, variance 
2




( ³ ºf i i X Y Cov , so that the level of firm-
specific human capital risk is the same in both firms. Finally, we allow for the market price of a unit of 
traded equity of firm 1 to deviate from fundamental value because of noise trader sentiment and limited 
arbitrage. For simplicity, employee sentiment and noise trader sentiment are identical, although allowing 
these to differ does not materially change the results. Formally, a unit of traded firm 1 equity can be 
purchased in the market for p(s), where p(0) = 1, and 0 ￿ p’(s) ￿ 1. In this formulation, p’(s) is a measure 
of the effectiveness of arbitrage. With p’(s) = 0 for all s, there are no limits to arbitrage and capital 
markets are perfectly efficient. When p’(s) = 1, arbitrage has no effect and prices move one for one with 
sentiment.
20 As there is no sentiment towards firm 2 equity, its market price equals its fundamental value 
of 1. 
 
Potential employees use their subjective beliefs about firm value to evaluate the compensation 
contracts offered by each firm (Wi, Ni, Mi) and take into account their ability to purchase traded equity on 
their  own.  For  empirical  realism,  we  assume  that  employees  cannot  sell  the  equity  they  receive  as 
compensation, though our results are unchanged without this assumption. We begin solving the model by 
                                                            
19 Borrowing constraints and transaction costs may be reasons different from bounded rationality for why employees 
are unable to use traded equity to create claims that they prefer to the compensation instruments offered by the firm.    11 
calculating the equity purchases of employees with a given compensation package. Since employees are 
risk averse and since they value firm 2 correctly, it is easy to see that employees never purchase firm 2 
equity on their own. In contrast, traded firm 1 equity may appear cheap to optimistic employees of either 
of the two firms. The optimal purchase of firm 1 equity by an employee of firm 1 with compensation 
package (W1, N1, M1) is the  1 ˆ N  maximizing the following expected, subjective utility: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] ) 1 1
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1 ( 2 2 2
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  (2) 
Solving this maximization problem of firm 1 employees, and the corresponding problem of firm 2 
employees, yields the following result: 
 
Lemma 1   The optimal purchases of firm 1 equity are given by: 
 
(a) for firm 1 employees:   }
) ( 1










  (3) 
(b) for firm 2 employees:   }
) ( 1







=   (4) 
 
Lemma 1 states that upon receiving (W1, N1, M1) from firm 1, employees of firm 1 purchase traded 




f - - + s p s  units of equity, taking 
into account the traded equity and non-traded compensation instruments received from the firm. If an 
employee has received more than her desired allocation of firm 1 equity as compensation, she would 
prefer to sell units of the traded equity instrument, but is by assumption precluded from doing so. An 
increase in sentiment s increases the demand for equity in firm 1 by both sets of employees, despite the 
fact that an increase in sentiment also tends to increase the price of traded firm 1 equity. This is because 
arbitrageurs cause the increase in price to be smaller than the increase in sentiment (p’(s) ￿ 1). Also, as 
would be expected, purchases by firm 1 employees are decreasing in firm-specific human capital risk, f . 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
20 This price structure is the outcome of standard models of financial markets with noise traders and limited 
arbitrage (see, for example, Shleifer (2000)).     12 
Since employees of firm 2 do not bear firm 1 firm-specific human capital risk, their purchases of firm 1 
equity are independent of f . 
 
Firms  maximize  shareholder  value  by  hiring  the  optimal  number  of  workers  and  minimizing 
compensation costs. In doing so, firms take into account that employees may purchase equity on their 
own, and that employees will work for the competing firm if its contract is more attractive: 
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The firms’ valuations of the compensation contracts differ from employees’ valuations because 
firms are risk neutral while employees are risk averse, and because employees (may) feel sentiment 
towards  equity  compensation.  The  difference  in  risk  aversion  by  itself  would  make  equity-based 
compensation inefficient since risk is transferred to the party less able to bear it. However, as will be 
shown, this conclusion may be reversed by sufficiently positive employee sentiment. 
 
The  equilibrium  in  this  model,  described  in  the  following  theorem,  is  given  by  a  pair  of 
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Theorem 1   The equilibrium compensation contracts and labor allocations are such that: 
 
(a) The perceived expected utility from working for each firm is equalized: 
 



















1 ˆ N  and 
2
1 ˆ N  are the optimal purchases of traded firm 1 equity by firm 1 and firm 2 employees 
respectively given in equations (3) and (4). 
   13 
 (b) The allocation of labor between the two firms is such that marginal products of labor equal actual 
compensation costs, and the labor market clears. 
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Proof    See Appendix A. 
 
The  intuition  for  the  first  three  parts  of  Theorem  1  is  straightforward:  In  equilibrium,  the 
compensation packages offered by both firms are perceived to be of equal value by potential employees, 
which is the only way both firms can simultaneously attract employees (part a).
21 Also, as is standard, the 
labor market must clear, and firms hire employees up to the point where their marginal product equals the 
cost  of  their  employment  (part  b).  Because  employees  are  risk  averse  and  do  not  exhibit  sentiment 
towards firm 2, firm 2 never offers equity in its compensation package (part c). 
 
The crux of Theorem 1 is in part d, which describes the optimal compensation contract offered by 
firm 1. Part (d.i) of Theorem 1 shows that employee optimism is, by itself, insufficient to make equity 
compensation profitable and to force firms away from cash wages. The essential insight is that the firm 
directly competes with the stock market when supplying equity to its employees. The availability of 
traded equity from the market places a limit on the amount of cash wages employees are willing to forgo 
in return for an extra unit of equity provided by the firm. Understanding this willingness to pay for equity   14 
is the key to understanding equity compensation. Since employees can buy traded equity on their own, 
their willingness-to-pay for traded equity is capped by the market price of equity, independently of their 
degree of optimism. Thus, with perfectly efficient markets as assumed in case (d.i), the cost to the firm of 
providing a unit of traded equity – its fundamental value – exactly equals the price which employees are 
willing to pay. Firm 1 is therefore indifferent between paying with cash and paying with traded equity of 
the same market value.  
 
Figure 2a below illustrates the result. The downward sloping curve represents employees’ valuation 
for each marginal unit of traded equity; marginal valuation decreases since employees are risk averse, and 
hence place lower values on each additional unit of traded equity. Crucially, employees’ willingness to 
pay firm 1 for equity, given by the bolded line in the figure, differs from employees’ marginal valuation. 
This is because, as long as employees’ marginal valuation exceeds 1, employees are willing to pay only 
the market price of 1 for each unit of traded equity. Once employees’ valuation falls below the market 
price, their willingness to pay simply equals their valuation.  Since the firm’s cost of compensating 
employees is 1 per unit of traded equity, it is indifferent between all contracts at which employees’ 
marginal willingness to pay equals 1. Thus, the firm is indifferent between any contract offering between 
zero  and 
2 /s f - s   units  of  traded  equity,  the  latter  being  the  point  at  which  employees’  marginal 
willingness to pay drops below the firm’s marginal cost.
22 Focusing on employees’ willingness to pay for 
equity rather than their valuation shows that the firm is unable to extract from employees any of the 
“consumer surplus” represented by the area between employees’ demand schedule and the firm’s fixed 
marginal cost. The availability of traded equity at fair prices through the market ensures that the firm 
captures none of the behavioral rents created by employees’ optimistic valuations. This result has been 
largely overlooked by the prior literature, which has focused on employees’ valuations of equity claims 
rather than their willingness to pay for equity. 
 
When markets are not perfectly efficient, in the sense that sentiment does affect equity prices (case 
(d.ii)), then firm 1 is no longer indifferent to the amount of traded equity it grants its employees. Because 
optimistic employees’ willingness to pay for traded equity goes as high as the (overvalued) market price, 
compensating employees with traded equity becomes profitable for the firm, as it is, in effect, equivalent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Equilibria in which one firm attracts all the potential employees and the other firm shuts down are ruled out by the 
assumption that  ¥ = ) 0 ( ' f .  
22 This upper bound equals the number of units of traded equity that an employee would buy on his own when 
purchasing equity at its fundamental value of 1.   15 
to issuing overvalued equity to the market.
23 Figure 2b provides a graphical representation of this case. 
Employees’ willingness to pay for traded equity is equal to the maximum of their valuation and the 
market price of traded equity, with the latter exceeding the fundamental value of 1 since the market is 
inefficient and sentiment is positive. The firm provides equity to its employees as long as employees’ 
willingness to pay for equity is greater than its fundamental value. The firm thus compensates each 
employee  with 
2 /s f - s   units  of  traded  equity,  and  in  doing  so  extracts  a  portion  of  employees’ 
behavioral consumer surplus (given by the shaded trapezoid). The difference between this case and case 
(d.i)  is  that  the  firm  is  selling  the  intra-marginal  units  of  equity  to  its  employees  at  prices  above 
fundamental  value.  Viewing  cases  (d.i)  and  (d.ii)  of  Theorem  1  together,  we  see  that  compensating 
employees  with  the  traded  equity  instrument  cannot  be  motivated  by  employee  sentiment  alone.  A 
















In contrast, compensating employees with the non-traded equity instrument can be explained by 
employee sentiment alone. The crucial difference is that employees’ willingness to pay for non-traded 
equity may exceed its fair market value if employees prefer the non-traded equity to traded equity of the 
same value.
24 Because firm 1 is a monopoly supplier of its non-traded compensation instrument, it is able 
to extract any sentiment premium for the compensation instrument over the traded equity (given by z(s) – 
                                                            
23 See footnote 11 for reasons why firms may prefer either equity compensation or direct equity issuance in this 
situation.  





















Willingness to Pay 
Figure 2b   16 
s).  Still, the availability of traded equity continues to place a cap on the amount of rents the firm can 
extract: the maximum amount optimistic employees are willing to pay for the compensation instrument is 
the market price of traded equity plus the employees’ excess valuation of the compensation instrument 
over traded equity. For example, if the market price of traded firm 1 equity is $5 per share, and optimistic 
employees value the traded equity at $10 and the compensation instrument at $11, then employees are 
willing to forgo at most $6 (= $5 + ($11 – $10)) in cash wages for a unit of the compensation instrument 
(and  only  $5  in  wages  for  a  unit  of  traded  equity).  The  sentiment  premium  for  the  compensation 
instrument over traded equity (z(s) – s) is equal to $1 and is successfully extracted by firm 1. Figure 2c 
provides a graphical representation of this case: We assume once more that the market is efficient so that 
the price of traded equity is 1. As the discussion above implies, employees willingness to pay for a unit of 
non-traded equity is capped at 1 + (z(s) – s), allowing the firm to extract a portion of the employees’ 














Finally, part (d.iv) simply states that when neither the sentiment for traded nor non-traded equity is 
sufficiently high to overcome the cost of being exposed to firm specific human capital risk, the firm 
resorts to compensating its employees with cash only. 
 
Moving beyond the requirements for equity compensation to be part of an optimal contract, the 
following theorem demonstrates formally how sentiment affects the profit levels of the two firms in 
equilibrium.  It  is  straightforward to  show  that  employment  levels  (firm  size)  and  profits  are  strictly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 Recall that even though options are not traded, their fair market value can be deduced from the price of the 
fundamentally equivalent traded shares.  
1 











Willingness to Pay 
Figure 2c   17 
increasing functions of each other in our model, and hence identical results apply to employment levels as 
well. 
 
Theorem 2    Assume that sentiment for traded and non-traded equity of firm 1 is positive: s > 0 and 
hence z(s) > 0. We have that: 
 
(a)  If  max(s,  z)  >  f ,  so that firm  1  pays  with  equity,  firm  1  makes  greater profits  and  hires  more 
employees than firm 2 if and only if: 
   
  max(z – s, 0) + (p(s) – 1) > f .  (6) 
 
(b) If max(s, z) ￿ f , so that firm 1 pays in cash, firm 1 makes smaller profits and hires fewer employees  
than firm 2. 
 
Proof    See Appendix A. 
 
There are two channels through which firm 1 can profit from positive sentiment. First, the firm extracts a 
sentiment premium for the non-traded compensation instrument when such a sentiment premium exists, 
as represented by the max(z – s, 0)  term in (6). When traded equity is preferred to the compensation 
instrument (s > z), this channel shuts down because employees can buy their preferred equity instrument 
in the market with no need for the firm.  The second channel works through sentiment’s effect on stock 
prices as represented by the (p(s) – 1) term in (6). Positive sentiment combined with imperfect arbitrage 
leads  to  overvalued  prices,  allowing  firm  1  to  profit  by  selling  overvalued  equity  to  its  optimistic 
employees. When the equity market is perfectly efficient, p is equal to 1, and this second channel closes. 
 
Firm 1 benefits from positive sentiment, and enjoys higher profits and employment than firm 2, if the 
combined overvaluation (p(s) – 1) and sentiment premium (z(s) – s) exceed the level of firm-specific 
human  capital  risk,  f .  Firm  specific  human  capital enters  into  the  calculation  because  firm  1  must 
compensate its employees for the correlation between their human capital and their equity holdings in 
firm 1.
25 All else equal, this places firm 1 at a disadvantage relative to firm 2; indeed, as can be seen from 
                                                            
25 Recall that, because employees exhibit sentiment only towards firm 1, they hold firm 1 but not firm 2 equity in 
our model. In general, if employees exhibit positive sentiment towards both firms, the firm with greater positive 
sentiment is the one towards which, ceteris paribus, employees have more equity exposure, and therefore the one 
which must compensate its employees more for their attendant firm specific human capital risk.   18 
part (b) of the theorem, when employees are excited about traded firm 1 equity, but not sufficiently 
excited to overcome the firm specific human capital risk (max(s, z) ￿ f ), then firm 1 has lower profits 
than firm 2 since employees prefer to work in firm 2 and invest in firm 1.  
 
In summary, the model has identified two reasons why firms pay optimistic employees with a non-traded 
equity compensation instrument: the extraction of a sentiment premium and the issuing of overvalued 
equity to employees. In both cases, firms pay with the compensation instrument because employees are 
willing to overpay for equity compensation. Beyond the motivation for paying employees with equity, the 
model illustrates the effects of sentiment on profitability and labor market outcomes. If firm-specific 
human capital risk is a serious problem when working for firm 1, and if the equity market is highly 
efficient, firm 2 can be the beneficiary of positive sentiment towards firm 1. On the other hand, when the 
non-traded compensation instrument is preferred to traded equity and the level of firm-specific human 
capital risk in firm 1 is moderate, or when markets are less efficient, it is firm 1 which benefits from 
positive sentiment towards its equity through lower compensation costs, a larger number of employees, 
and higher profits. Firm 2 reacts by increasing its wage offer, and still loses employees to firm 1 in 
equilibrium.  
 
Thus, which firm benefits from employee sentiment in reality depends on the level of firm specific human 
capital risk and the level of stock price misvaluation. The prior empirical and experimental evidence 
(Benartzi (2001), Degeorge et al. (2004), Klos and Weber (2004)) suggests that employees tend to ignore 
the correlation between human capital and stock returns when evaluating investments. If employees, 
rightly or wrongly, act as if firm-specific human capital risk f  is low, then positive sentiment for firm 1 
is more likely to benefit firm 1. Market overvaluation of firm 1 stock caused by positive sentiment and 
limits to arbitrage advantages firm 1 further.
26 In light of our model, the stock option boom of the 1990s’ 
technology  bubble  likely  represents  a  case  of  positive  sentiment  towards  options  combined  with 
overvalued stock prices, which lead to an expansion of technology firms at the expense of other firms.  
 
With  the  theoretical  foundation  for  the  use  of  equity  compensation  to  optimistic  employees 
established,  we  next  review  the  prior  empirical  and  theoretical  literature  on  broad-based  equity 
compensation. We pay particular attention to the behavioral literature on expectations formation and to 
                                                            
26 A natural extension of our model would allow for employee sentiment to affect also employees’ perception of the 
value of their human capital. Positive sentiment towards firm 1 then gives employees a direct preference for 
employment in firm 1 over  firm 2, allowing, once again, firm 1 to lower its compensation costs and increase its size 
and profits relative to firm 2.   19 
the empirical literature on employee behavior towards company stock, in order to derive predictions about 
where and when employee sentiment is likely to induce equity-based compensation.  
 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
The question as to why some firms encourage or even mandate holdings of company equity by non-
executive employees has attracted considerable attention. Oyer and Schaefer (2005) present an extensive 
discussion of the potential benefits of stock option usage in firms. They argue that the incentive effects 
from options for lower-level employees are likely to be insignificant and outweighed by the cost of 
exposing employees to risk.
27 They further argue that the vesting structure of option grants helps firms 
retain  employees.  Lazear  (1999)  and  Murphy  (2002)  have  shown  that  other  forms  of  deferred 
compensation that do not expose employees to stock price risk are a more efficient means of providing 
retention incentives.
28 A large number of papers quantify the deadweight loss from selling company 
equity  and  options  to  employees,  with  a  general  consensus  that  employees’  rational  valuations  of 
company stock and options are significantly below fair market values.
29  
 
Murphy (2002, 2003) proposes that firms perceive the cost of option compensation as low and 
prefer it to cash compensation because options bear no accounting charge and incur no outlay of cash. We 
view this hypothesis as complimentary to the employee sentiment hypothesis, though we note that it does 
not explain the cross-sectional and time series patterns of option compensation presented in Section 6. 
Inderst and Müller (2004) show that employee option compensation can be beneficial because it lowers a 
firm’s compensation bill in bad states of nature in which owners should have full cash flow rights in order 
to induce efficient strategic decisions. Finally, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) argue that option compensation 
allows firms to screen for optimistic employees. As we discuss in the introduction, Oyer and Schaefer 
focus on employees’ valuations rather than their willingness-to-pay for equity compensation, and they do 
not incorporate firms’ competition with the stock market as supplier of equity to employees into their 
                                                            
27 Kruse and Blasi (1997) and Kruse (2002) review the evidence on the hypothesis that equity ownership by 
employees helps to align stakeholder interests and find mixed results at best. 
28 Oyer and Schaefer (2005) argue on the basis of Oyer (2004) that unvested options serve to index employees'  
deferred compensation to their outside opportunities and reduce transaction costs associated with the renegotiation 
of compensation. 
29 See, for example, Lambert, Larcker, and Verecchia (1991), Murphy (1999), Hall and Murphy (2001), Meulbroek 
(2001 and 2002), Ingersoll (2002), Jenter (2002), and Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003).   20 
analysis.  The  model  in  the  previous  section  demonstrates  the  importance  of  the  constraints  this 
competition imposes on firms.
30 
  
Core and Guay (2001) are the first to perform a large-sample analysis of non-executive employee 
stock option holdings, grants, and exercises. They document the widespread use of stock option grants to 
non-executive employees in a sample of 756 firms during 1994 to 1997. They present evidence that grants 
are positively associated with investment opportunities and with the difference between cash flow from 
investment  and  cash  flow  from  operations  (“cash  flow  shortfall”).  Anderson,  Banker  and  Ravindran 
(2000) as well as Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2001) document that stock option compensation is used 
most extensively in “new economy” firms. Interestingly, and consistent with the evidence we present 
below, Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2001) show that new economy companies with greater cash flows 
use employee options more extensively, contradicting the notion that options are used to alleviate cash 
constraints.  Finally,  Desai  (2002)  and  Graham,  Lang,  and  Shackelford  (2002)  consider  the  effect  of 
employee stock options on corporate taxes. These studies focus on how option compensation affects 




There is considerable evidence that employees’ thinking about company stock and employee stock 
options is subject to behavioral biases. Benartzi (2001) provides evidence that employees excessively 
extrapolate  past  performance  when  deciding  about  company  stock  holdings  in  their  401(k)  plans. 
Employees  of  firms  with  the  worst  stock  performance  over  the  last  10  years  allocate  10%  of  their 
discretionary contributions to company stock, whereas employees whose firms experienced the best stock 
performance  allocate  40%.  There  is  no  evidence  that  allocations  to  company  stock  predict  future 
performance.
32 Huberman and Sengmüller (2004) analyze 401(k) allocations in a larger sample and find 
that employees choose higher inflow allocations and transfers to company stock based on past returns 
over a three-year window, and to a much smaller extent based on volatility and business performance. 
                                                            
30 Zhang (2002) argues that employee option compensation occurs when both managers and employees view firm 
equity as overvalued. Through the exercise of granted options and sale of the resultant shares employees and the 
firm are, in effect, colluding to sell overvalued equity to the market. Employee sentiment does not play a role in the 
model as employees’ opinion about firm value is identical to that of managers. 
31 Graham, Lang, and Shackelford (2002) point out that, despite the massive size of option-related tax deductions, 
the net effect of option compensation is most likely a revenue gain for the U.S. Treasury because of the income 
taxes that employees pay at exercise.  Therefore, option compensation cannot be explained as a tax-saving strategy. 
See also Core and Guay (2001).  
32 Benartzi (2001) also conducts a survey with Morningstar.com visitors asking them to rate the performance of their 
companies’ stock over the last five years and the next five years. Despite the fact that individual stock returns are 
largely unpredictable, the respondents’ past and future ratings where positively correlated with a r of 0.52, 
consistent with excessive extrapolation.   21 
Liang  and  Weisbenner  (2002)  show  that  the  average  share  of  participants’  discretionary  401(k) 
allocations in company stock is almost 20%, and increasing in prior stock price performance.  
 
The psychology and behavioral finance literature provides possible explanations for the observed 
biases  in  employee  thinking  about  company  equity:  excessive  extrapolation  can  be  attributed  to  the 
representativeness heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). They show that people expect 
that a sequence of events generated by a random process will resemble the essential characteristics of that 
process even when the sequence is short. In an extension, Griffin and Tversky (1992) document that 
people tend to focus on the strength or extremeness of the evidence provided, while giving insufficient 
regard to its weight or predictive power. People tend to see trends and patterns even in random sequences, 
and  expect  especially  extreme  sequences  to  continue.  In  the  context  of  company  equity,  the 
representativeness  heuristic  may  lead  employees  to  expect  extreme  good  and  extreme  bad  price 
performance to continue into the future.  
 
Finally, there is substantial evidence that employees tend to underestimate, or even ignore, the 
correlation between their firm-specific human capital and firm stock returns when making investment 
decisions.  Benartzi  (2001),  Huberman  and  Sengmüller  (2004),  and  Liang  and  Weisbenner  (2002) 
document that employees invest significant portions of their retirement funds in 401(k) plans voluntarily 
into company stock. Degeorge et al. (2004) show that during the partial privatization of France Telecom, 
employees  with  high  firm-specific  human  capital  risk  invested  more  in  their  employer’s  equity. 
Consistent with this, Klos and Weber (2004) report evidence from laboratory experiments showing that 
investors fail to take background risk into account when making investment decisions. The empirical 
evidence, therefore, suggests that firm-specific human capital risk is unlikely to play an important role in 
the design of optimal employee compensation schemes, or in terms of the notation of our model, f  is 




4. Empirical Predictions 
 
The model in Section 2 predicts that equity-based compensation is used when employees are optimistic 
about the non-traded equity compensation instrument and value it above its fair market value (z(s) > 0), 
and when employees strictly prefer the non-traded compensation instrument to the equity available in the 
                                                            
33 An alternative interpretation suggested by Huberman (2001) is that concerns about firm-specific human capital 
risk are counterbalanced and outweighed by employees’ desire to invest into firms they are “familiar” with.   22 
market  (z(s)  >  s).  Greater  employee  exuberance  about  firm  equity  should  therefore  make  equity 
compensation  more  likely  and  lead  to  a  higher  percentage  of  equity  compensation  in  total  pay. 
Empirically,  stock  options  are  the  most  common  form  of  equity  compensation  for  rank  and  file 
employees, and correspond well to the non-traded compensation instrument in our model: for most firms, 
employee options are not traded and hence employees are unable to directly observe market prices for 
them, and their valuation as a function of observable prices and volatilities is sufficiently difficult to 
exceed  the  abilities  of  almost  all  employees.
34  Most  employees  are  likely  to  simply  compare  the 
compensation instrument offered by their employer to traded shares, which are the simplest alternative 
available in the market, and then use valuation heuristics to decide which of the two assets they prefer. 
 
The results in Benartzi (2001) and Huberman and Sengmüller (2002) suggest that prior stock returns are a 
major determinant of employees’ willingness to invest in company stock, with sentiment improving with 
prior stock price performance. We further conjecture that other measures of high and increasing firm 
quality, like investment, cash balances, and R&D, are positively correlated with employee sentiment, 
while any signs of distress (high leverage, high interest burden) are associated with worsening sentiment. 
Finally,  we  make  use  of  the  psychology  literature  on  expectations  formation  reviewed  above  to 
understand the factors determining excessive extrapolation.  
 
Learning and extrapolating from past option payoffs is an obvious heuristic for employees with 
no knowledge of rational option valuation. Due to the amplified nature of option payoffs, employees are 
likely to extrapolate more strongly from past performance when valuing options than when valuing stock 
or any other simple traded equity position which they recognize. Thus, after periods with high stock 
returns, employees are likely to view options as more desirable than the traded equity they see in the 
market. On the other hand, employees are likely to assign low values to options after periods with low 
stock returns. In terms of the notation of our model, we expect employee sentiment for the non-traded 
compensation instrument (options) to react more strongly to past performance than employee sentiment 
for traded equity (z’(s) > 1), and thus the sentiment premium of options over traded equity to increase in 
past performance (z(s) – s larger after good performance). Finally, the empirical evidence that employees 
tend to ignore correlations between human capital and stock returns suggests that firm-specific human 
capital risk  f  is unlikely to significantly dampen employees’ demand for equity compensation after 
periods of high stock returns (z(s) – s > f ). 
 
                                                            
34 Single-stock options for some firms are traded. They are usually of much shorter maturity than the options used   23 
The  observation  that  employees’  private  valuations  of  company  equity  increase  in  past 
performance (and for many rise above the market price), combined with the hypothesized increase in the 
sentiment premium of options over stock in past performance, leads to our first testable hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms should be more likely to grant options and should grant more options to employees 
after high stock returns. 
  
Griffin  and  Tversky  (1992)  document  that  people  tend  to  give  excessive  weight  to  extreme 
information while giving insufficient regard to its weight or predictive power. We therefore conjecture 
that the relationship between past performance and employee sentiment is non-linear, with employee 
exuberance associated mostly with extraordinarily good returns. Extraordinarily good returns are further 
amplified in option payoffs, making it likely that option sentiment exceeds sentiment for traded equity. 
This leads to our second hypothesis:  
 
H2: Options grants should be non-linearly related to past performance and concentrated among 
the very best past performers.  
  
Benartzi (2001) documents that the effect of past returns on employees’ purchases of company 
stock increases in the time frame over which past returns are measured. We therefore conjecture that the 
path of past returns is important in determining employee sentiment towards the firm, and propose that 
employee sentiment will be especially positive following a series of years with high stock returns. This 
leads to our third hypothesis:  
 
H3: Firms should be most likely to grant options and use more options as compensation after the 
stock price has done well over several years.  
 
While positive sentiment can make option compensation the profit-maximizing choice, negative 
sentiment  makes  option  compensation  clearly  inferior  to  cash  compensation.  We  conjecture  that 
employees in firms in financial or economic distress are unlikely to be exuberant about the prospects for 
company  equity,  and  indeed  are  likely  to  exhibit  negative  sentiment  towards  it.  Thus,  even  though 
distressed firms are likely to face binding cash constraints and would like to compensate their employees 
with equity, they will be unable to do so. Our fourth hypothesis is therefore:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for compensation, and few employees are likely to be aware of their existence.   24 
H4: Firms in financial or economic distress should be less likely to pay their employees with 
options.  
 
Our model of employee compensation predicts that firms which pay with equity are able to lower 
their labor costs and expand relative to firms which do not benefit from positive sentiment, as long as 
firm-specific human capital risk is not too much of a concern for employees. The empirical evidence 
suggests that employees tend to ignore correlations with human capital risk when evaluating investments. 
Hence our fifth hypothesis predicts a positive link between option compensation and employment growth: 
 
H5:  Firms  which  pay  their  employees  with  options  are  characterized  by  faster  growth  in 
employment compared to firms which do not pay with options.  
 
Finally, our model predicts that firms are more likely to pay their employees with equity when the 
top managers of the firm  view the stock price as too high. With or without sentiment premium for 
options, managers may use actual or perceived inside information about firm value when deciding on the 
optimal compensation mix. This leads to our final hypothesis: 
 
H6:  Firms  are  more  likely  to  use  options  and  grant  more  options  to  employees  whenever 
managers have reason to view the stock as overvalued. 
 
The next section describes the data sets we use to test these hypotheses. 
 
 
5. Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
 
5.1 Data Sources 
Our main source of data on employee option grants is the Standard & Poors ExecuComp database. The 
ExecuComp data provides information on option grants to the five highest-paid executives of each firm in 
the S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P SmallCap stock indexes for the 1992 to 2003 period. Desai (2002) 
has extrapolated this data to firm-wide option grants by making use of the requirement that firms report 
the share of total grants represented by grants to the top five executives. In particular, the ExecuComp 
variable “pcttotop” reports the percentage which each grant to executives represents of all options granted 
to employees. Hence, each reported executive grant provides an estimate of the number of options granted 
to all employees during the fiscal year. We use the mean of these estimates as a proxy for the number of   25 
options  granted  to  all  employees  in  a  given  firm-year.  We  drop  all  firm-years  in  which  the  sample 
standard deviation of these estimates is greater than 10 percent of the mean. 
 
As  is  standard  in  the  literature,  we  estimate  the  number  of  options  granted  to  non-executive 
employees  by  subtracting  the  number  of  options  granted  to  the  top  five  executives,  taken  from 
ExecuComp, from the number of options granted to all employees. We then apply the Black-Scholes 
(1973) formula to value the options granted to non-executive employees. We do not know the exercise 
and stock prices at which the non-executive options are granted. To minimize the measurement error from 
estimating these prices, we assume that 1/12
th of the total number of options granted during the year are 
granted each month, and use the midpoint of the month high and month low stock prices as the exercise 
and strike price.
35 The estimates of dividend yield and stock price volatility used in the Black-Scholes 
formula  are  taken  from  ExecuComp.
36  The  risk-free  rate  is  set  to  6  percent,  and  option  maturity  is 
uniformly set to ten years.
37 Finally, we calculate the per-employee value of options granted by dividing 
the value of options granted to all non-executive employees by the average of the beginning-of-the-year 
and end-of-the-year number of employees. 
 
There are obvious weaknesses to our data on employee stock options. We obtain only an estimate 
of option grants to non-executive employees, and we do not have information on the number of options 
outstanding, option exercises, and the number of options expired, forfeited or cancelled. Furthermore, we 
have  to  estimate  the  strike  and  grant  prices  of  the  options  grants,  introducing  noise  into  the  grant 
valuations. Finally, since we extrapolate from executive grants to employee grants, we miss firm-years in 
which no executives received options. This also implies that firms which use options for neither top 
executives  nor  rank-and-file  employees  are  incorrectly  coded  as  missing,  rather  than  zeros.  This 
introduces a sample selection bias which we discuss in detail in Section 6.5. An additional weakness of 
the data, common to all studies on this topic, is the absence of information on how deep the options are 
spread into the organization. 
 
                                                            
35 Our results do not materially change when the price at which the options are valued and their exercise price are 
taken to be the midpoint of the year high and year low stock price, or the midpoint of the year open and close stock 
prices. The results are similarly unchanged when the per-option value of the executive options reported in 
ExecuComp is used as estimate of the value of the employee options. 
36 If dividend yield data is unavailable on ExecuComp, we calculate it as the average dividend yield over the 
previous two years using Compustat data. If stock price volatility is unavailable on ExecuComp, we calculate it from 
daily stock return data over the previous two years taken from CRSP. Volatility estimates are censored at 80 percent 
to eliminate outliers.   26 
To check the robustness of our approach to estimating option grants, and to assess the effect of 
sample selection bias on our results, we repeat our analyses on a smaller, hand-collected data set on 
employee option grants.
 We obtain the data on option grants collected from annual reports by Core and 
Guay (2001) for the years 1995 to 1997 for a subset of the companies in our full sample.
38 We then extend 
the Core and Guay data through further hand collection to the years 1998 to 2000. As a first robustness 
check, we calculate the correlation between our measure of option grants with the more precise measure 
obtained from the hand-collected data. The correlation coefficient is 0.93, providing some assurance that 
measurement problems are not severe. A more detailed analysis of the hand collected data is presented in 
Section 6.5. All the results obtained with the full data set are robust and usually stronger in the hand-
collected data.   
 
5.2 Variable Definitions 
Our main measure of past performance (and hence sentiment) in year t is the annualized stock return, 
taken from CRSP, over the previous two years calculated from the beginning of year t – 2 to the end of 
year t – 1. For brevity, we call this return the prior two-year return. We also control for contemporaneous 
year t stock returns in all our regressions, but note that a positive relation between contemporaneous 
returns and the value of option grants could be purely mechanical: if the number of at-the-money options 
to be granted is determined at the beginning of the fiscal year, then high stock returns during the year lead 
to high grant prices and hence high Black-Scholes values. 
 
In all our regressions we attempt to control for corporate cash constraints.  Measuring whether a 
firm is cash constrained is a difficult task (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) and we utilize several composite 
measures of cash constraints developed in other papers as well as their disaggregated components. We use 
two measures of financial constraints proposed by Core and Guay (2001): cash flow shortfall and interest 
burden. Cash flow shortfall is the three-year average of common and preferred dividends plus cash flow 
used in investing activities less cash flow from operations, all divided by total assets. Interest burden is 
the three-year average of interest expense scaled by operating income before depreciation, with interest 
burden set to one when interest expense is greater than operating income before depreciation. A third 
measure of financial constraints we use has been developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and adopted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
37 The last assumption likely overstates the estimated life of the options since employees tend to exercise options 
early (Huddart and Lang (1996)) and because some options are forfeited. Assuming shorter maturities of five or 
seven years does not change our results. 
38 Core and Guay (2001) collect data from annual reports for 1997 for all firms (excluding banks) with fiscal year 
1997 data in the ExecuComp database. We are grateful to John Core and Wayne Guay for kindly making their data 
available to us.     27 
to large-sample empirical work by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001). We follow Baker, Stein and 
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.    (6) 
 
Here CFit is cash flow, Ait-1 is lagged assets, DIVit is cash dividends, Cit is cash balances, LEVit is 
leverage, and Qit is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity all over assets. 
All ingredients of KZ are winsorized at the 1% level before the measure is constructed. A conceptual 
difficulty with the KZ measure is that it contains both measures of the availability of funds (CF, DIV, C, 
LEV) and a measure of investment opportunities in Q. Following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), we 
construct  a  cropped  KZ  measure,  called  KZ4,  which  excludes  Q.  The  construction  of  the  financial 
constraint measures is described in detail in Appendix B. 
 
Following the previous literature, we further control for investment opportunities, hypothesizing 
that employees in firms with higher growth opportunities will be granted more options. This could be the 
case because providing incentives to employees is more important with greater growth opportunities, 
because growth firms need to preserve cash, or because employee sentiment is higher in growth firms. As 
in Core and Guay (2001), we use the three-year average of R&D scaled by assets as a proxy for growth 
opportunities.  We  include  Q  as  an  alternative  measure  of  growth  opportunities  in  most  regressions.  
Finally, we also control for sales as measure of firm size, and use a long-term debt indicator as a proxy for 
access to debt markets. 
 
Our model predicts that managers’ perception of misvaluation is a determinant of employee option 
grants. To assess the effect of managerial inside information on compensation policy, we examine the 
relationship  between  option  grants  to  non-executive  employees  and  earnings  manipulation.  We  use 
discretionary current accruals as calculated in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998 a,b) from changes on the 
balance sheet as our first measure of earnings manipulation. This measure has been criticized by Hribar 
and  Collins  (2001)  who  show  that  it  is  prone  to  misinterpret  merger  effects  and  foreign  currency 
adjustments  as  earnings  manipulation.    Hribar  and  Collins  propose  a  more  robust  calculation  of 
discretionary accruals using information from the cash flow statement, and we use their approach to 
construct two additional measures of discretionary accruals. The calculations are described in detail in 
Appendix  B.  Briefly,  both  methods  predict  “normal”  accruals  using  a  year-by-year  industry  level 
regression  model.  The  regression  residual  is  considered  to  have  been  “managed”  and  is  called   28 
discretionary current accruals (DCAs). After calculating DCAs for all firm years, we label firms with 
discretionary accruals in the top 10% of all firm-years as “manipulators”. 
 
We use insider trading by managers as a second indicator of manager opinion about fundamental 
firm value. Managerial insider trading is calculated as in Jenter (2005) from data on managerial stock 
ownership  reported  in  the  ExecuComp  database.  The  net  number  of  shares  bought  or  sold  by  each 
executive in a given year is derived as the change in stock holdings less the number of shares acquired 
through option exercises and stock grants. Dollar values are calculated by multiplying the number of 
shares  acquired  (or  sold)  by  the  year-end  stock  price.  We  scale  each  manager’s  trades  by  her  total 
exposure to company equity, defined as the sum of her stock and option holdings at the beginning of the 
year plus stock and option grants during the year. We then average the scaled insider trades for all 
managers in a firm-year to obtain a firm-wide measure of managers’ insider trades.  
 
Finally, we use two measures of open-market share repurchases based on Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) as further indicators of manager opinion about 
fundamental firm value. The first measure is based on the Compustat data item “Purchases of Common 
and Preferred Stock”. Similar to Kahle (2001) and Grullon and Michaely (2002), we subtract decreases in 
the value of preferred stock to minimize the effect of redemptions of preferred stock. The second measure 
of repurchases uses the change in the number of shares outstanding from CRSP, which we adjust for 
stock  grants  to  top  executives  and  for  option  exercises.  The  details  of  the  variable  construction  are 
described in Appendix B. 
 
5.3 Sample Screens 
Our initial sample comprises all 2,598 firms from the ExecuComp database in an unbalanced panel 
from  1992  to  2003,  and  includes  21,732  firm-years.  We  exclude  the  127  firm-years  for  which  our 
estimate  of  the  total  number  of  options  granted  is  smaller  than  the  options  granted  to  the  top  five 
executives as reported in ExecuComp. We eliminate 1,064 observations for which the standard deviation 
of our estimates of the number of options granted in a given firm-year is greater than 10% of the mean 
estimate. Finally, we exclude  firm-years because information on at least one of the variables used in our 
base regressions is missing.
39 The final data set used in our base regressions comprises 2,171 firms and 
                                                            
39 The 7,643 deleted firm-years are dropped for the following, non-exclusive reasons: 4,815 because one of the 
variables necessary to calculate the per-employee dollar value of option grants is missing, 1,580 because KZ cannot 
be calculated, 1,357 because KZ4 cannot be calculated, 1,484 because the average cash flow shortfall is missing, 
2,323 because the average interest burden is missing, 394 because Q is missing, 895 because contemporaneous stock   29 
12,898 firm-years. Similar screens are applied to the hand-collected data set assembled by Core and Guay 
(2001) and extended by ourselves. The data set is a subset of our full sample and runs from 1995 to 2000. 
The final hand-collected sample contains 889 firms and 4,279 firm years. 
 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the full sample. The firms in our sample have a 
median  equity  value  of $1.083  billion,  median  sales  of  $1.073  billion,  and median  assets of  $1.067 
billion. The median number of employees is 5,400. Turning to option grants, the median firm grants 
options equal to 1.8% of shares outstanding per year. Employees ranking below the top-five executives 
receive 71% of the options granted. The median per-employee option grant is $1,029 per year for non-




6. Empirical Results 
 
As an initial test of the employee sentiment hypothesis, we assess the relationship between employee 
option grants and past stock returns in a univariate setting. We sort firms by the value of their per-
employee option grants into quintiles and calculate average stock returns over the previous two years for 
each quintile. Panel A of Table 2 reports results consistent with the sentiment hypothesis: mean (median) 
prior stock returns are 7 percent (7 percent) for firms with option grants in the lowest quintile and rise to 
30 percent (19 percent) for firms with grants in the highest quintile. Similarly, when sorting firms by prior 
returns in Panel B, firms in the lowest return quintile grant options with a mean (median) value of $7,850 
($1,116) while firms with prior returns in the top quintile grant options worth $21,155 ($2,838). Hence, 
consistent with out first hypothesis, intensive use of non-executive options is preceded by extraordinarily 
good performance. 
 
To better control for other cross-sectional determinants of employee option grants, we turn to a 
regression framework. Our baseline specification is: 
 
it it it X ret employee per grants of value dollar Ln 2 1 1 0 ) 1 ( b b b + + = + -  + ￿it.   (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
returns are missing, 2,380 because stock returns for the prior two years are missing, 103 because sales are missing, 
117 because the long-term debt indicator is missing, and 4 because average R&D is missing.   
40 The average grant values are likely to be overstated because of sample selection bias. We discuss this issue in 
detail in Section 6.5.   30 
Here retit-1 is a measure of a firm’s past stock return, and X is a vector of firm characteristics. We estimate 
the baseline regression with several measures of past returns and include several measures of financial 
constraints. All regressions include industry fixed effects based on 3-digit SIC codes as well as year fixed 
effects unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
 
6.1 The effect of past performance on employee option grants 
We first test the hypothesis that employee option grants increase in prior stock price performance. In each 
column of Table 3 a different measure of financial constraints is included as explanatory variable, and 
past  performance  is  measured  as  the  stock  return  over  the  previous  two  years.  The  cash  constraint 
measures used are KZ, KZ4, average cash flow shortfall, and interest burden. In all specifications, we 
further control for log sales and R&D, as well as a dummy variable measuring whether the firm has long 
term debt.  
 
The first hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. In all specifications in Table 3 the coefficient 
on prior stock returns is positive and highly statistically and economically significant: a 10 percentage 
point increase in stock returns is associated with a 5.3 to 8.6 percent increase in the value of options 
granted. The t-statistics, calculated using robust standard errors with clustering at the firm level, are 
between 12.29 and 18.93. Employee option grants are used more intensively by firms with better past 
stock price performance. The coefficient on contemporaneous stock returns is positive and significant in 
the first specification without Q, and becomes insignificant when the highly collinear Q is included.  
Since the relationship between grant values and contemporaneous returns may be purely mechanical and 
driven  by  inertia  in  the  contracting  technology,  we  focus  our  analysis  on  past  stock  performance. 
Including firm fixed effects (Table 4) does not materially change the results.  
 
Our  second  hypothesis  is that  the  relationship  between  stock  price  performance  and  employee 
sentiment should be non-linear, so that option grants are concentrated among the very best performers. To 
allow for a non-linear relationship, we sort firms by their prior performance into quintiles and assign a 
dummy variable to each quintile. Cut-off levels are constructed using the entire pooled sample. Repeating 
the analysis from Table 3 while replacing the prior return variable with the performance quintile dummies 
shows that the effect of past returns on option grants is indeed highly non-linear (Table 5): in each 
specification the effect of moving from quintile one to quintile four is smaller than the effect of moving 
from quintile four to quintile five. 
   31 
To test our third hypothesis that firms should be most likely to grant options to employees after the 
stock price has done well for several years, we sort firms into quintiles based on prior one, two, three, 
four, and five year returns. From here on we use a base regression specification which includes the usual 
set of firm characteristics and KZ4, cash flow shortfall, and interest burden as comprehensive measures of 
financial constraints. Table 6 shows that options are granted in a manner consistent with the results in 
Benartzi (2001) and the employee sentiment hypothesis: the effect of past returns on option grants is 
increasing in the window over which the past returns are calculated. When sorting on previous one-year 
returns, we find option grants which are 29 percent larger in the highest return quintile compared to the 
lowest quintile. This difference increases to 67 percent when sorting on previous 3-year returns, and to 87 
percent when sorting on previous 5-year returns.  
 
6.2 The effect of cash constraints on employee option grants 
Several measures of cash constraints are included as control variables in Tables 3 to 6. Examining the 
coefficients on these composite measures of cash constraints produces conflicting results. Cash flow 
shortfall is consistently positively related to grants, suggesting that cash poor firms use more options to 
pay  their  employees.  On  the  other  hand,  interest  burden  is  consistently  negatively  related  to  grants, 
implying that cash constrained firms use fewer option grants. Finally, the KZ measure is not significantly 
related to grants.  
 
To better understand the effect of cash constraints on firms’ option granting behavior, we analyze 
the relationship between option grants and each of the components of the composite measures separately. 
The results are presented in Table 7. We find that the value of option compensation per non-executive 
employee is increasing in cash balances, increasing in cash flow, increasing in Q, and decreasing in 
leverage.
41 Firms with large amounts of cash and high cash flows grant more options, while firms with 
more need for cash to service debt grant fewer options.
42 On the other hand, we also find that option 
compensation  is  decreasing  in  dividends,  and increasing  in  cash flow  used for  investment  activities. 
Taken together, these results are supportive of the sentiment hypothesis: variables which are arguably 
positively related to employee sentiment (Q, cash balances, cash flow, investment) predict greater use of 
option  grants,  while  variables  negatively  related  to  sentiment  like  leverage  and  interest  burden  are 
associated  with  less  use  of  options.  Since  composite  measures  of  cash  constraints  include  both 
                                                            
41 The same positive relationship between cash balances and option grants shows up in the univariate results in 
Table 2C. Firms in the lowest cash balance quintile pay a mean (median) option value of   $2,274 ($524) to each 
employee while those in the highest cash quintile pay a mean (median) value of  $30,111 ($10,525).    32 
components  which  are  positively  related  to  sentiment  as  well  as  components  negatively  related  to 
sentiment, these results explain why different composite measures of cash constraints show conflicting 
correlations with option grants.
43  
 
6.3 Employee option grants in distressed firms 
The fourth hypothesis states that firms in or close to financial or economic distress should be less likely to 
pay their employees with options, as employees of these firms are unlikely to be exuberant about the 
prospects  for  company  stock.  Thus,  even  though  distressed  firms  are  likely  to  face  binding  cash 
constraints and would prefer to compensate their employees with equity, if employee sentiment plays an 
important role in the ability to use equity compensation, they will be unable to do so. 
 
To test this hypothesis we construct an indicator variable for firms which delist for performance 
reasons in the first year after the end of the current fiscal year, and a second indicator variable for firms 
which delist in the second year after the end of the current fiscal year. Performance-related delistings are 
identified through CRSP delisting codes in the 400 to 591 range. We propose that these firms have both 
employees  with  low  sentiment  and  an  urgent  need  to  conserve  cash.  Table  8  shows  the  results  of 
regressing the log of per-employee option grants on the two delisting dummies and the same control 
variables as in the base regression. In support of the sentiment hypothesis, firms which are about to delist 
grant significantly fewer options to their employees. In the specifications with industry fixed effects, 
firms which are one year from delisting grant between 72 and 74 percent less to their employees than 
firms which do not delist, while firms which are two years from delisting grant 40 percent less, with all 
coefficients highly significant. The coefficients are smaller and less significant when firm fixed effects 
are included, indicating that firms one year from delisting grant between 48 (p-value 0.088) and 54 (p-




                                                                                                                                                                                           
42 An alternate explanation for the negative relation between firm leverage and option grants is that firms substitute 
the tax shield obtained from employee option exercises for debt tax shields. For a discussion of this argument see 
Graham, Lang, and Shackelford (2002). 
43 The results are unchanged when we repeat the analysis using firm fixed effects, with the positive effect of cash 
flow on option grants strengthened. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
44 This analysis does not necessarily generalize to all distressed firms. We identify firms which are subsequently 
delisted, i.e. most likely firms which did not manage to recover, and show that they were unable or unwilling to 
conserve cash by paying their employees in options. It is possible that other firms were able to substitute options for 
cash pay and to avert the delisting.   33 
6.4 Employee Options and Growth in Employment 
Our  fifth  hypothesis  predicts  a  positive  link  between  employment  growth  and  employee  option 
compensation. We define employment growth as the percentage change in the number of employees 
relative to the number of employees at the beginning of the fiscal year. The employment growth variable 
is winsorized at the 1 percent level to dampen the effect of outliers.  
 
Table 9 shows the results of adding employment growth to the base regression. Consistent with the 
model predictions, employment growth and stock option grants are strongly linked, even when controlling 
for past and contemporaneous stock returns. An increase of ten percentage points in employment growth 
translates into 7.1 percent larger per-employee option grants in a cross-sectional regression, and into 3.9 
percent larger per-employee option grants with firm fixed effects.  
 
6.5 Sample Selection Bias and Robustness Checks 
In this section we perform several tests to assess the robustness of the empirical results presented in 
the previous sections. The ExecuComp database encompasses a wide range of firms with employment 
size ranging from 5 to 1.4 million. Paying all or the majority of employees with stock options in a firm 
with few employees can be fully justified as a means to provide incentives to maximize firm value. This 
raises the concern that our previous results may be driven by small firms. Table 10 shows that our base 
regression results are robust to restricting the sample to firms with more than 500 and to firms with more 
than  1,000  employees.  A  second  concern  with  our  analysis  is  that  linear  regressions  may  not  be 
appropriate because the dependent variable is censored at zero. Employee option grants cannot become 
negative, suggesting that a censored (Tobit) regression model is the appropriate choice. Table 11 repeats 
the  base  regression  using  a  Tobit  set-up.  The  coefficient  estimates  are  quite  similar  to  the  linear 
regressions in Tables 3 and 4, even though, as would be expected from the censoring- induced attenuation 
bias, the Tobit coefficients are generally larger and more significant than the coefficients from the linear 
regressions.  
 
A more serious concern is that our calculation of employee option grants from the ExecuComp 
database requires that at least one top executive receives an option grant in any given year. We lose firm-
years in which no top executive receives options, leading to a sample selection problem. We record a 
missing observation both for firms which do not grant options to anyone, and for firms which grant 
options to rank-and-file employees but not to top executives. This sample selection biases the estimates of 
average per-employee grants in Table 1 upwards since firms which do not grant options to anyone drop 
out. The second effect of the sample selection is that the estimated relation between past performance and   34 
employee option grants is likely understated. Casual inspection of the data suggests that option grants to 
top executives tend to drop to zero after bad stock price performance. Hence we lose more observations 
after  bad  performance,  which  is  when  we  expect  employee  stock  option  grants  to  decline  due  to 
worsening sentiment.  
 
The  only  method  to  confirm  that  the  sample  selection  bias  does  indeed  work  in  the  direction 
suggested is to use hand-collected data which contains valid observations on firms which do not grant 
options to their top executives. We use the data set collected by Core and Guay (2001) for the time period 
1995 to 1997 and extended by us to the years 1998 to 2000. The firms in this data set are a subset of the 
firms in the ExecuComp database. We run the base regression of per-employee option grants on the usual 
explanatory variables and present the results in Table 12. Regressions (1) and (2) are linear regressions 
corresponding to the analyses in Tables 3 and 4, while regressions (3) and (4) are Tobit regressions 
corresponding to the analyses in Table 11. As hypothesized, the estimated effects of prior performance on 
employee option grants are larger than the estimates from the full data set: a 10 percentage point increase 
in past returns is associated with an increase in employee option grants of between 7.4 and 10.9 percent. 
For comparison, Panel B shows the same regressions for the same set of firms and the same sample 
period but using options data extrapolated from ExecuComp rather than the hand-collected data.  
 
6.6 Earnings Manipulation and Insider Trading by Managers 
Our model predicts that firms are more likely to use employee options when executives view the 
stock  price  as  too  high.  To  test  this  hypothesis  we  identify  two  situations  in  which  we  can  make 
inferences about managers’ opinion about the fundamental value of the firm in relation to its market 
value. One such situation is when managers manipulate earnings to boost the current stock price, in which 
case managers have reason to view their stock as overvalued. We measure earnings manipulation using 
three  different  measures  of  discretionary  accruals,  based  on  Teoh  et  al.’s  (1998  a,b)  cross-sectional 
adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model. The first measure of discretionary accruals is based on 
current accruals calculated from year-to-year changes of the balance sheet. Hribar and Collins (2001) 
propose two alternative definitions of accruals which are computed directly from the cash flow statement 
and  therefore  not  affected  by  non-operating  changes  in  accounts. The  details  of  the  calculations  are 
explained in Appendix B. Firms with discretionary accruals in the top 10 percent of all firm-years in our 
sample are classified as likely manipulators. Table 13 shows the base regression with added indicator 
variables for earnings manipulators.  Consistent with our hypothesis, option compensation is strongly 
positively associated with earnings manipulation. Controlling for industry effects or firm-fixed effects, 
earnings manipulation predicts a 13 to 23 percent higher value of option grants per employee.   35 
 
Our second measure of managers’ views on firm value is insider trading. We identify firms with 
high insider selling and firms with high insider buying using the methodology in Jenter (2005). We label 
firms in which managers’ normalized inside buying is in the top 20 percent of all firm-years as firms with 
“buying managers” and firms in which managers’ inside selling is in the top 20 percent as firms with 
“selling managers”. The regression results for the base regression with indicator variables for buying and 
selling managers, as well as indicators for earnings manipulation, are presented in Table 14.  Across all 
specifications with industry fixed effects, we consistently find that firms in which the top five managers 
cash out grant between 11 and 19 percent more options to their employees than comparable firms, while 
firms in which top managers purchase equity for their own account grant between 17 and 19 percent less 
to employees. These results suggest that top executives increase option grants to rank-and-file employees 
when they regard the stock as overvalued, and reduce grants when they regard the stock as undervalued. 
At the same time, though, the relation between insider trading and employee option grants vanishes when 
firm fixed effects are included. This suggests that it is cross-firm variation in insider trading, rather than 
changes in insider trading for a given firm, which is correlated with employee option grants. Hence there 
is a concern that the correlation between insider trading and employee option grants may be due to 
unobserved differences across firms which are not picked up by our control variables.  
 
Finally,  we  examine  share  repurchase  decisions  by  option  granting  firms  to  provide  further 
evidence on executives’ beliefs on equity mispricing. Prior literature has shown that many firms which 
use broad-based option compensation are also repurchasing shares in the market. If top executives view 
their own stock price as too high, they should be reluctant to repurchase shares at market prices, and 
should instead consider issuing new shares into the market. Weisbenner (2000), Kahle (2001), and Bens, 
Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003) argue that firms with employee option programs repurchase shares to 
offset  the  dilution  of  earnings-per-share  (EPS)  resulting  from  employee  option  grants  and  exercises. 
Observing that firms in the same year both grant options to employees and repurchase shares from the 
market would therefore indicate that any perception of stock prices overvaluation is, at the very least, not 
strong enough to overcome executives’ aversion against EPS dilution.  
 
We use two measures of share repurchases for our analyses. The first measure uses the Compustat 
data item “Dollar Value of Common and Preferred Repurchased”, from which we subtract any decreases 
in the value of preferred stock in the same year. The second measure of repurchases uses the change in the 
number of shares outstanding from CRSP, which we adjust for stock grants to top executives and for 
option exercises. The need for option exercise data implies that the analysis using the second measure is   36 
restricted  to  the  smaller,  hand-collected  sample  described  in  Section  5.1.
45  Table  15  shows  share 
repurchase activity as a function of employee option grants. Neither the incidence nor the intensity of 
open market share repurchases show a strong relationship with employee option grants. Even among the 
most intensive users of employee option grants, 38% to 51% of firms are repurchasing shares, and the 
average repurchaser acquires between 2.61% and 3.85% of shares outstanding per year, depending on the 
measure used. This is despite the fact that the most intensive option granters have high prior stock returns, 
which are usually associated with fewer share repurchases. These results indicate that, at least for a 
sizeable subset of the firms in our sample, equity overvaluation is unlikely to be the main driver behind 
broad-based option compensation. Many of the heaviest option granters are also active repurchasers of 
company equity at market prices, rendering it unlikely that these market prices are viewed as substantially 
overvalued by top executives. 
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyze whether the popularity of option compensation for rank and file employees in 
large firms may be driven by employee optimism. We model the optimal compensation policy of a firm 
faced with employees who exhibit sentiment towards it, and assess whether employee optimism leads to 
option  compensation.  We  find  that  employee  optimism  by  itself  is  insufficient  to  make  equity 
compensation optimal for the firm. The crucial insight is that firms compete with financial markets as 
suppliers of equity to employees: the ability of employees to purchase equity on their own restricts their 
willingness to pay for equity compensation and hence restricts or even eliminates firms’ incentive to pay 
with equity. We show that option compensation is used in equilibrium only if employees are willing to 
overpay for equity. This occurs in our model if employees prefer the (non-traded) options offered by the 
firm to the (traded) equity offered by the market, or if the (traded) equity is overvalued. We argue that 
employees are, in certain situations, willing to overpay for options because rational option valuation is 
difficult and beyond their abilities. When faced with the need to evaluate options, employees are likely to 
rely on heuristics and to value options on the basis of their own or their peers’ past experience with option 
payoffs. This makes it likely that employees strictly prefer options to both stock and cash after periods 
with high stock returns and high option payoffs. 
 
We  proceed  by  providing  empirical  evidence  confirming  that  firms  use  broad-based  option 
compensation when boundedly rational employees are likely to be excessively optimistic about company 
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value, and when employees are likely to have a strict preference for options over stock. We show that 
employee option grants are positively associated with previous stock returns, investment and investment 
opportunities, and with cash balances and cash flows. In contrast, grants are negatively associated with 
interest burden and leverage, and firms in distress reduce their option grants in the periods before they 
delist. These findings are consistent with the view that options are used in firms in which employees are 
exuberant about their employer, and in which employees prefer the options offered by the firm to traded 
shares. Further, as predicted by our model, firms seem to use the lower compensation costs resulting from 
overpayment for option compensation to expand in size.  
 
Finally,  also  consistent  with  the  model,  we  find  some  evidence  that  managers  use  option 
compensation for rank-and-file employees more aggressively when managers believe that their company 
stock is overvalued. On the other hand, a sizeable subset of the heaviest option granters in our sample are 
also  active  repurchasers  of  company  equity,  rendering  it  unlikely  that  market  prices  are  viewed  as 
substantially  overvalued  by  top  executives.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  a  perception  of  equity 
overvaluation  by  top  executives  is  not  sufficient  to  explain  all  employee  option  programs.  In  the 
framework of our model, and consistent with the empirical evidence found, this leaves an employee 
preference for options over traded equity as a driving force behind option compensation.   38 
APPENDIX A: Proofs 
 
Proof of Theorem 1 
 
Assuming that the perceived utilities of employees working in the two firms are not equal leads to a 
contradiction, as the firm whose employees have higher utility could profitably deviate by marginally 
reducing its compensation costs. Further, differentiating the Lagrangian associated with maximization 
problem (6) leads immediately to 
* * * *) ( ' i i i i M N W l f + + = . 
 
We now solve for the optimal firm 1 compensation contract assuming that its employee must obtain a 
utility of u . Assume first that s ￿ f, so that 
1
1 ˆ N  = 0. Firm 1’s optimization problem is therefore: 
 
0 , 0 , 0
] ) ( 2 ) [(
2
1





1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 , , 1 1 1
³ ³ ³
³ + + + + - + + + +
+ +
W M N
u M N M N s N z M W t s
M N W Min
Y
M N W
f s s     (A1) 
 
It is easy to see that the first inequality constraint will be binding, and so we can easily eliminate W1 from 
the maximization problem by representing it as a function of N1 and M1. Denoting the Lagrangian of the 
problem by ￿, we have that s M N
N
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) ( . Since s ￿ f, 
it is easy to see from the Kuhn-Tucker complimentary slackness requirements that N1 = 0. Also, if z ￿ f , 







Assume now that f < s < f + p – 1.  We have that 
1
1 ˆ N  = 0, and firm 1’s maximization problem is identical 
to that written above. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions show that when z ￿ s, the optimal compensation 










M  and N1 = 0.  
Next, assume that s > f + p – 1. If 
1
1 ˆ N  = 0, then the solution is identical to the case where f < s < f + p – 
1. If, on the other hand, 
1












1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
, , 1 1 1
u
p s p s
N p s N N z M W t s
















Since once again the first inequality constraint will be binding, with some algebraic manipulation it is 
easy to see that the above maximization problem can be written as: 
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Thus, when p > 1, the solution to the problem involves N1 = ￿ in contradiction to 
1
1 ˆ N  > 0. Additionally, 
when p = 1 but z > s, the solution involves M1 = ￿ in contradiction once again to 
1
1 ˆ N  > 0. Finally, when p 
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Putting it all together, we see that firm 1’s optimal compensation policy follows that described in part (d) 




2 = = M N , is proven in an analogous 
way by considering the case of  s = z = 0 above.  
 
 
Proof of Theorem 2 
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Since  0 ' ' < f , we have that  2 1 l l >  if and only if p(s) – 1 > f . Finally, since firm i’s profits are given by 
i P = f(li) – li (Wi+Ni+Mi) = f(li) – li f’ (li), it is easy to see that  1 2 l l >  if and only if  1 2 P > P . 
 
 
Consider next the case where z > f  and z > s. Using part (d.iii) of Theorem 1, we have that  0
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Since 0 ' ' < f , we have that  2 1 l l >  (and  2 1 P > P ) if and only if (p(s) – 1) + (z(s) – s)  > f . 
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we have that  1 2 l l ³  and, therefore, also  1 2 P ³ P . If p(s) < 1+s then   1 2 P > P , i.e., firm 1 makes 
strictly smaller profits than firm 2.   41 
APPENDIX B: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Measures of cash constraints 
We  use  both  composite  measures  of  cash  constraints  developed  in  other  papers  as  well  as  their 
disaggregated components. Core and Guay (2001) propose two measures of financial constraints: cash 
flow shortfall and interest burden. They define cash flow shortfall as the three year average of common 
and preferred dividends (Compustat data items 19 and 21)  plus cash flow used in investing activities 
(data item 311) less cash flow from operations (data item 308), all divided by total assets (data item 6). 
Interest burden is the three-year average of interest expense (data item 15) scaled by operating income 
before depreciation (data item 13), where interest burden is set to one when interest expense is greater 
than operating income before depreciation. 
 
A third measure of financial constraints we use has been developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
and adopted to large-sample empirical work by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001). We follow Baker, 
















KZ 283 . 0 139 . 3 315 . 1 368 . 39 002 . 1
1 1 1
+ + - - - =
- - -
,  (B1) 
 
where CFit is cash flow (data item 14+data item 18), Ait-1 is lagged assets (data item 6), DIVit is cash 
dividends (data item 21+data item 19), Cit is cash balances (data item 1), LEVit is leverage ((data item 9 + 
data item 34)/ (data item 9 + data item 34+data Item 216)),  and Qit is the market value of equity (price 
times shares outstanding from Compustat) plus assets minus the book value of equity (data item 60 + data 
item 74) all over assets. All ingredients of KZ are winsorized at the 1% level before the measure is 
constructed. One conceptual difficulty with the KZ measure for our purposes is that it contains both 
measures of the availability of funds (CF, DIV, C, LEV) and a measure of investment opportunities in Q. 
Following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), we construct a cropped KZ measure called KZ4 which 
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We  interpret  KZ4  as  a  measure  of  the  availability  of  cash  with  which  a  firm  can  finance  its 
investment opportunities. Thus, in the calculus of supply and demand of cash used to construct a measure 
of  financial  constraints,  we  view  KZ4  as  representing  the  supply  of  cash  to  a  firm.
46    Similarly,  Q 
represents investment opportunities and hence the demand for cash in this calculus.  
 
 
Measures of earnings manipulation 
We use discretionary current accruals as calculated in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998 a,b) as our first 
measure of earnings manipulation. Current accruals are defined from the balance sheet as follows: 
 
] [ ] [ CurrLTDebt CurrLiab Cash CurrAsset CABS - D - - D = .  (B3) 
 
Here CurrAsset stands for current assets (Compustat data item 4), Cash stands for cash and short-term 
investments (data item 1), CurrLiab stands for current liabilities (data item 5), and CurrLTDebt is the 
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current  portion  of long-term  debt  (data item  44). Teoh  et  al.  use a  cross-sectional  adaptation of the 
modified  Jones  (1991)  model  to  split  current  accruals  into  their  discretionary  and  non-discretionary 
components.  This entails regressing accruals on the change in sales in a cross-sectional regression using 
all  firms  in  the  same  two-digit  SIC  code  on  Compustat,  excluding  the  firm  for  which  discretionary 
accruals are to be calculated. The cross-sectional regression is performed each fiscal year for each sample 
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TAj,t-1 is lagged total assets (data item 6)  and ￿Salesj,t is the change in sales (data item 12) in year t. The 
predicted (fitted) accruals of the sample firm are calculated using the estimated regression coefficients 
from (B4) and the actual change in sales net of the change in trade receivables. The fitted accruals are 




















- - 1 ,
, ,
1 ,
, ˆ 1 ˆ
t i





NDCA b a .  (B5) 
 
Here ￿AccRec is the change in accounts receivables in year t, and is meant to account for changes in 
credit sales. The remaining current accruals are the residual discretionary current accruals and are the 
portion of current  accruals  which  are interpreted as  signaling  earnings  manipulation.  High  values  of 













.  (B6) 
 
The balance sheet based measure of earnings manipulation used by Teoh et al. has been criticized 
by  Hribar  and  Collins  (2001)  who  show  that  DCAi,t  is  affected  by  nonoperating  events  such  as 
reclassifications,  acquisitions,  divestitures,  accounting  changes,  and  foreign  currency  translations.  In 
particular, Hribar and Collins show that the misclassification of merger effects as earnings manipulation 
is empirically important and can lead to incorrect inferences about the presence and effects of earnings 
manipulation. Hribar and Collins propose two alternative definitions of accruals which are computed 
directly from the cash flow statement and therefore not affected by non-operating changes in accounts. 
The first measure captures total accruals and is calculated as  
 
CF CF CFO EBXI TAC - = ,  (B7) 
 
where  TACCF  stands  for  total  accruals,  EBXI  stands  for  earnings  before  extraordinary  items  and 
discontinued operations (Compustat data item 123), and CFOCF stands for operating cash flows from 
continuing operations (data item 308 – data item 124). The second Hribar and Collins measure of accruals 
uses only the changes in the non-cash working capital accounts and is more directly comparable to the 
balance sheet definition of current accruals presented above. Hribar and Collins compute this measure as 
follows: 
 
( ) CF CF CF CF CF CF CF Dep Other Tax AccPay Inv c Acc CA + D + D + D + D + D - = Re .  (B8)   43 
 
Here  ￿AccRecCF  is  the  decrease  in  accounts  receivable  (data  item  302),    ￿InvCF  is  the  decrease  in 
inventory (data item303), ￿AccPayCF is the increase in accounts payable (data item 304), ￿TaxCF is the 
increase in taxes payable (data item 305), ￿OtherCF is the net change on other current assets (data item 
307), and DepCF is depreciation expense (data item 125). Given the two Hribar and Collins measures of 
accruals, we again split accruals into their discretionary and nondiscretionary components using the cross-
sectional industry regression approach as in Teoh et al. and presented above in equations (B4) to (B6). 
 
Measures of share repurchases 
The  first  measure  of  share  repurchases  uses  the  “Purchases  of  Common  and  Preferred  Stock”  from 
Compustat (data item 115) less any decrease in the par value of preferred stock (data item 130). The 
second  measure  calculates  share  repurchases  (and  issues)  as  the  difference  in  the  number  of  shares 
outstanding between the beginning and the end of the fiscal year. The number of shares outstanding is 
taken from the monthly CRSP tapes. The decrease in the number of shares outstanding is then adjusted 
for both executive stock grants and stock option exercises. The number of shares granted to executives is 
calculated as the dollar value of restricted stock grants taken from ExecuComp divided by an estimate of 
the stock price on the grant date. We use the average of the midpoints of the month high and month low 
stock prices as estimate for the stock price. The number of options exercised by both top executives and 
rank-and-file employees is hand-collected from annual reports as described in Section 5.1. 
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Figure 1: Average option grants per non-executive employee in large firms. Per employee option 
grants (left y-axis) are the dollar value of options granted to employees divided by the average number of 
employees during the firm  year. The options granted to employees are calculated by subtracting the 
number  of  options  granted  to  top-five  executives  from  the  total  number  of  options  granted.  Market 
cumulative return (right y-axis) is calculated using CRSP value weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ data. 
The sample is restricted to firm-year observations in which the average number of employees exceeds 
1000.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics. Per employee option grants are the dollar value of options granted to 
employees divided by the average number of employees during the firm year. The options granted to 
employees are calculated by subtracting the number of options granted to top-five executives from the 
total number of options granted. Q is the market value of equity plus assets  (Compustat data item 6) 
minus the book value of equity (data item 60 + data item 74) all over assets. R&D is the three-year 
average of R&D (data item 46) scaled by assets. The cash constraint measures KZ and KZ4 are calculated 
as in Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003). Cash flow shortfall is the three year average of common and 
preferred dividends (Compustat data items 19 and 21) plus cash flow used in investing activities (data 
item 311) less cash flow from operations (data item 308), all divided by total assets. Interest burden is the 
three-year average of interest expense (data item 15) scaled by operating income before depreciation (data 





        
Number of observations  12,898 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
  Mean  Median 
Number of employees  19,018  5,400 
Total option grants relative to shares 
outstanding 
18%  1.8% 
Employee option grants relative to total 
grants 
67%  71% 
Per employee option grants  $8,818  $1,029 
Market value of equity (millions)  $5,466  $1,083 
Book assets (millions)  $6,329  $1,067 
Sales (millions)  $3,992  $1,073 
Q  2.00  1.51 
3-year average of R&D to assets  3.3%  0.00% 
Panel B: Measures of cash constraints 
  Mean  Median 
Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) measure of cash 
constraints 
0.87  0.88 
KZ4 measure of cash constraints  0.30  0.35 
3-year average of cashflow shortfall   1.44%  0.59% 
3-year average of interest burden  20%  13% 
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Table 2. Prior returns, cash balances and employee option compensation. The per employee option 
grants are the dollar value of options granted to employees divided by the average number of employees 
during a firm year. The options granted to employees are calculated by subtracting the number of options 
granted to top-five executives from the total number of options granted. Normalized cash balances are 
calculated as cash balances (Compustat data item 1) divided by lagged assets (data item 6). Stock returns 
are constructed from the CRSP monthly return files. The stock return over the previous two years is 
calculated as the annualized stock return over fiscal years t-1 and t-2 for employee option grants made in 




              
Panel A: Prior stock returns by per employee option grant quintile 
       
Stock return over 
previous two years 
  Option grant quintile  Mean  Median 
  1  7%  7% 
  2  13%  10% 
  3  14%  12% 
  4  18%  14% 
   5  30%  19% 
Panel B: Per employee option grants by prior stock return quintile 
 
Option grant per 
employee 
 
Stock return quintile over 
previous two years  Mean  Median 
  1  $7,850  $1,116 
  2  $4,987  $718 
  3  $4,469  $692 
  4  $5,632  $888 
   5  $21,155  $2,838 
Panel C: Per employee option grants by cash balance quintile 
 
Option grant per 
employee 
  Cash balance quintile  Mean  Median 
  1  $2,274  $524 
  2  $2,445  $574 
  3  $3,592  $746 
  4  $5,674  $1,366 
   5  $30,111  $10,525 











   51 
 
Table  3.  Regression  of  log  option  grants  per  employee  on  past  returns  and  measures  of  cash 
constraints. The Long Term Debt Dummy is an indicator variable which takes a value of one if a firm 
has long term debt and zero otherwise. All other variables are calculated as in Tables 1 and 2. All 
regressions  include  year  dummies  and  three-digit  SIC  industry  dummies.  T-statistics  use 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
 
                 
  Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
0.86  0.54  0.55  0.54  0.53  Stock return over previous two years 
[18.93]**  [12.29]**  [12.79]**  [12.34]**  [12.38]** 
0.19  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.02 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[9.34]**  [1.74]  [1.58]  [1.47]  [0.74] 
  0.31  0.32  0.30  0.31  Qt 
   [14.30]**  [15.10]**  [14.36]**  [14.36]** 
0.03          KZt-1 
[1.26]         
  -0.02      -0.01  KZ4t-1 
  [0.85]      [0.19] 
    2.11    2.36  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
    [9.37]**    [10.40]** 
      -0.34  -0.55 
Interest burdent-1 
         [2.84]**  [4.06]** 
-0.09  -0.10  -0.07  -0.11  -0.08  Log sales 
[4.69]**  [5.75]**  [3.89]**  [6.04]**  [4.32]** 
-0.51  -0.23  -0.33  -0.22  -0.28  Long term debt dummy 
[6.04]**  [2.95]**  [4.10]**  [2.74]**  [3.60]** 
5.28  3.96  3.29  4.30  3.79 
R&D 
[5.82]**  [4.76]**  [3.85]**  [4.95]**  [4.21]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.80  5.78  5.60  5.91  5.76  Constant 
[35.02]**  [36.49]**  [34.96]**  [34.97]**  [34.36]** 
Observations  12898  12898  12898  12898  12898 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.55  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.59 
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Table  4.  Regression  of  log  option  grants  per  employee  on  past  returns  and  measures  of  cash 
constraints with firm fixed effects. All variables are defined as in Table 3. All regressions include year 
dummies and firm fixed effects. T-statistics use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for 
clustering at the firm level. 
 
 
                 
  Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
0.57  0.41  0.45  0.43  0.42  Stock return over previous two years 
[14.86]**  [9.58]**  [10.69]**  [10.17]**  [9.91]** 
0.12  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[7.12]**  [0.93]  [0.58]  [1.11]  [1.77] 
  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.15  Qt 
   [8.46]**  [8.89]**  [8.62]**  [8.57]** 
-0.03          KZt-1 
[1.27]         
  -0.11      -0.07  KZ4t-1 
  [4.18]**      [2.88]** 
    0.83    1.03  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
    [3.56]**    [4.32]** 
      -0.89  -0.79 
Interest burdent-1 
         [7.37]**  [6.46]** 
-0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.06  -0.06  Log sales 
[0.40]  [0.48]  [0.60]  [1.50]  [1.45] 
-0.04  0.05  -0.02  0.02  0.03  Long term debt dummy 
[0.64]  [0.70]  [0.28]  [0.38]  [0.54] 
-1.65  -2.13  -2.34  -1.95  -1.89 
R&D 
[2.09]*  [3.07]**  [3.34]**  [2.75]**  [2.70]** 
Company fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.64  5.61  5.61  6.05  5.97  Constant 
[20.37]**  [20.77]**  [20.50]**  [22.18]**  [22.13]** 
Observations  12898  12898  12898  12898  12898 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.81  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.82 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table 5. Regression of log option grants per employee on past return quintiles and measures of cash 
constraints.  Quintiles  of  past stock  returns  are  constructed  using  the  pooled sample.  Quintile  i is a 
dummy variable taking a value of one when a firm' s stock return over fiscal years t-1 and t-2 is in the ith 
quintile, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined as in Table 3. All regressions include year 
dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies. T-statistics use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
and allow for clustering at the firm level.  
 
                 
  Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Stock return over previous two years           
-  -  -  -  -  Quintile 1 
         
0.19  0.07  0.10  0.05  0.06  Quintile 2 
[4.28]**  [1.49]  [2.31]*  [1.10]  [1.34] 
0.32  0.13  0.18  0.11  0.13  Quintile 3 
[7.16]**  [2.93]**  [4.01]**  [2.53]*  [2.90]** 
0.48  0.23  0.28  0.21  0.24  Quintile 4 
[11.01]**  [5.35]**  [6.57]**  [4.96]**  [5.47]** 
0.98  0.55  0.59  0.54  0.56 
Quintile 5 
[21.90]**  [11.90]**  [12.88]**  [11.72]**  [12.10]** 
0.18  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.03  Contemporaneous stock return 
[8.72]**  [2.51]*  [2.37]*  [2.41]*  [1.44] 
  0.32  0.33  0.32  0.31  Qt 
   [14.91]**  [15.82]**  [15.15]**  [14.90]** 
0.02          KZt-1 
[1.04]         
  -0.03      -0.02  KZ4t-1 
  [1.44]      [0.77] 
    2.18    2.44  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
    [9.48]**    [10.57]** 
      -0.36  -0.54 
Interest burdent-1 
         [2.94]**  [3.92]** 
-0.09  -0.10  -0.07  -0.11  -0.08  Log sales 
[4.86]**  [5.76]**  [3.96]**  [6.07]**  [4.26]** 
-0.51  -0.21  -0.32  -0.21  -0.26  Long term debt dummy 
[5.92]**  [2.67]**  [4.04]**  [2.61]**  [3.36]** 
5.19  3.84  3.16  4.18  3.64 
R&D 
[5.62]**  [4.59]**  [3.66]**  [4.78]**  [4.03]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
6.47  6.22  6.03  6.37  6.18  Constant 
[41.16]**  [41.03]**  [39.24]**  [39.10]**  [37.93]** 
Observations  12898  12898  12898  12898  12898 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.55  0.57  0.58  0.58  0.58 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table 6. Regression of log option grants per employee on past return quintiles and measures of cash 
constraints.  The sample is restricted to firms for which 5 years of past returns are available on CRSP. 
Prior returns for different horizons are defined similarly to prior two-year returns in Table 2. For example, 
the  prior  three-year  return  for  year  t  is  the  annualized  three  year  return  over  the  36  month  period 
comprising years t-3, t-2, and t-1. All other variables are defined as in Tables 3 and 5. All regressions 
include year dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies. T-statistics use heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
                
   Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










-  -  -  -  -  Quintile 1 
         
-0.01  0.07  0.11  0.16  0.19  Quintile 2 
[0.19]  [1.37]  [2.39]*  [3.29]**  [3.99]** 
0.01  0.11  0.25  0.28  0.31  Quintile 3 
[0.11]  [2.39]*  [5.11]**  [5.47]**  [5.86]** 
0.05  0.20  0.39  0.49  0.52  Quintile 4 
[1.01]  [4.21]**  [7.78]**  [9.17]**  [9.29]** 
0.29  0.52  0.67  0.77  0.87 
Quintile 5 
[6.59]**  [10.50]**  [12.67]**  [12.94]**  [13.70]** 
-0.08  -0.05  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  Contemporaneous stock return 
[3.08]**  [1.76]  [0.95]  [0.44]  [0.18] 
0.37  0.34  0.32  0.30  0.29  Qt 
[14.80]**  [13.32]**  [12.68]**  [12.12]**  [11.52]** 
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  KZ4t-1 
[0.27]  [0.39]  [0.45]  [0.36]  [0.15] 
1.83  1.85  1.69  1.42  1.27  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[6.45]**  [6.56]**  [6.05]**  [5.13]**  [4.55]** 
-0.63  -0.58  -0.44  -0.32  -0.22 
Interest burdent-1 
[4.00]**  [3.70]**  [2.83]**  [2.02]*  [1.43] 
-0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.06  Log sales 
[2.37]*  [2.33]*  [2.48]*  [2.57]*  [2.73]** 
-0.26  -0.29  -0.29  -0.28  -0.27  Long term debt dummy 
[3.01]**  [3.27]**  [3.27]**  [3.23]**  [3.16]** 
3.39  3.55  3.66  3.80  3.89 
R&D 
[3.58]**  [3.70]**  [3.81]**  [3.95]**  [4.01]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.91  5.86  5.71  5.62  5.65  Constant 
[32.20]**  [31.98]**  [31.34]**  [30.86]**  [31.30]** 
Observations  11143  11143  11143  11143  11143 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.56  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table  7.  Regression  of  log  option  grants  per  employee  on  past  returns  and  measures  of  cash 
constraints. Dividends (Compustat data item 21 + data item 19), cash balances (data item 1), leverage ((data 
item 9 + data item 34)/ (data item 9 + data item 34+data item 216)) and cash flow to investment (-data item 
311) are normalized by lagged assets (data item 6). All other variables are defined as in Tables 3. All 
regressions include year dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies. T-statistics use heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
 
                    
  Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
0.85  0.51  0.33  0.51  0.53  0.27  Stock return over previous two years 
[18.76]**  [11.00]**  [7.79]**  [11.92]**  [12.72]**  [6.60]** 
0.19  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  0.01  0.00 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[9.20]**  [1.47]  [0.50]  [1.42]  [0.24]  [0.17] 
  0.30  0.28  0.30  0.28  0.29  Qt 
   [13.76]**  [13.91]**  [14.40]**  [14.24]**  [14.51]** 
Dividendst-1  -10.85          -14.63 
  [6.09]**          [8.89]** 
Cash flowt-1    0.52        -0.04 
    [2.49]*        [0.21] 
Cash balancest-1      1.41      1.18 
      [15.63]**      [13.88]** 
Leveraget-1        -0.63    -0.65 
        [6.01]**    [6.32]** 
Cash flow to investmentt-1          3.41  2.67 
               [11.84]**  [9.70]** 
-0.05  -0.11  -0.06  -0.09  -0.08  0.02  Log sales 
[2.84]**  [5.91]**  [3.12]**  [4.71]**  [4.70]**  [0.81] 
-0.54  -0.23  -0.08  -0.12  -0.28  -0.04  Long term debt dummy 
[6.58]**  [2.92]**  [1.08]  [1.51]  [3.59]**  [0.63] 
5.26  4.32  3.07  3.97  4.95  3.74 
R&D 
[5.85]**  [4.95]**  [4.19]**  [4.88]**  [6.90]**  [5.94]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.83  5.80  5.38  5.80  5.34  5.16  Constant 
[35.75]**  [36.21]**  [34.22]**  [36.51]**  [34.10]**  [34.16]** 
Observations  12898  12898  12898  12898  12898  12898 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.56  0.58  0.59  0.58  0.59  0.62 
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Table 8. Regression of log option grants per employee on past returns, measures of distress, and 
measures of cash constraints.  Distress is measured by whether a firm delists for performance-related 
reasons in the next fiscal year (t+1) or in the fiscal year after the next (t+2). CRSP delisting codes 
between 400 and 599 are used to identify performance-related delistings. All other variables are defined 
as in Table 3. Regressions (1) and (3) include year dummies and 3-digit SIC dummies, regressions (2) and 
(4) include year dummies and firm fixed effects. T-statistics use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
  
         
   Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.72  -0.48  -0.74  -0.54  Delisted in the following year (t+1) 
[2.98]**  [1.71]  [3.06]**  [1.92] 
    -0.40  -0.30 
Delisted two years later (t+2) 
      [2.18]*  [1.54] 
0.53  0.41  0.52  0.41  Stock return over previous two years 
[12.30]**  [9.88]**  [12.26]**  [9.85]** 
-0.02  0.04  -0.03  0.03 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[0.98]  [1.60]  [1.12]  [1.52] 
0.31  0.15  0.31  0.16  Qt 
[14.35]**  [8.59]**  [14.39]**  [8.61]** 
-0.01  -0.075  -0.004  -0.075  KZ4t-1 
[0.17]  [2.90]**  [0.15]  [2.88]** 
2.38  1.04  2.39  1.04  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[10.46]**  [4.37]**  [10.51]**  [4.37]** 
-0.53  -0.77  -0.52  -0.76 
Interest burdent-1 
[3.90]**  [6.27]**  [3.83]**  [6.20]** 
-0.08  -0.06  -0.08  -0.06  Log sales 
[4.35]**  [1.53]  [4.40]**  [1.60] 
-0.28  0.03  -0.28  0.03  Long term debt dummy 
[3.62]**  [0.49]  [3.60]**  [0.52] 
3.79  -1.84  3.80  -1.81 
R&D 
[4.21]**  [2.55]*  [4.21]**  [2.49]* 
Industry fixed effects  Yes    Yes   
Firm fixed effects    Yes    Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.77  5.99  5.78  6.01  Constant 
[34.44]**  [22.19]**  [34.50]**  [22.30]** 
Observations  12898  12898  12898  12898 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.59  0.82  0.59  0.82 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
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Table 9. Regression of log option grants per employee on past returns, employment growth, and 
measures  of  cash  constraints.    The  percentage  change  in  the  number  of  employees  for  year  t  is 
calculated as the difference between the employment numbers at the end of fiscal years t and t-1, divided 
by the number of employees at the end of fiscal year t-1. The ratio is winsorized at the 1 percent level to 
dampen the effect of outliers. All other variables are defined as in Table 3. Regression (1) includes year 
dummies and 3-digit SIC  dummies, regression (2) includes year dummies and firm fixed effects. T-
statistics use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
     
  
Dependent variable: Log 
option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2) 
0.71  0.39  Percentage change in number of 
employees  [12.48]**  [7.95]** 
0.42  0.37  Stock return over previous two years 
[9.88]**  [8.77]** 
-0.06  0.02 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[2.39]*  [0.81] 
0.30  0.15  Qt 
[13.90]**  [8.52]** 
0.00  -0.058  KZ4t-1 
[0.05]  [2.26]* 
2.10  1.00  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[9.41]**  [4.27]** 
-0.48  -0.76 
Interest burdent-1 
[3.59]**  [6.26]** 
-0.07  -0.06  Log sales 
[3.90]**  [1.56] 
-0.30  0.01  Long term debt dummy 
[3.88]**  [0.11] 
3.99  -1.80 
R&D 
[4.47]**  [2.66]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes   
Firm fixed effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
5.86  6.07  Constant 
[35.40]**  [22.69]** 
Observations  12898  12898 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.59  0.82 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       58 
Table  10.  Regression  of log  option grants  per  employee  on  past  returns  and  measures  of  cash 
constraints for large firms only.  Regressions (1) and (2) exclude firm years with average employment 
of less than 500 employees, regressions (3) and (4) exclude firms with average employment of less than 
1,000 employees. All variables are defined as in Table 3. Regressions (1) and (3) include year dummies 
and 3-digit SIC dummies, regressions (2) and (4) include year dummies and firm fixed effects. T-statistics 
use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
         
   Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.54  0.44  0.52  0.45  Stock return over previous two years 
[13.27]**  [12.41]**  [11.75]**  [11.14]** 
-0.03  0.04  -0.04  0.04 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[1.16]  [1.73]  [1.28]  [1.30] 
0.33  0.16  0.35  0.17  Qt 
[16.26]**  [8.61]**  [15.55]**  [7.97]** 
0.03  -0.06  0.04  -0.05  KZ4t-1 
[1.29]  [2.08]*  [1.56]  [1.57] 
2.74  0.97  2.60  1.09  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[12.59]**  [4.24]**  [11.35]**  [4.57]** 
-0.65  -0.78  -0.63  -0.78 
Interest burdent-1 
[4.61]**  [5.58]**  [3.94]**  [4.90]** 
-0.04  -0.04  -0.01  -0.06  Log sales 
[1.99]*  [0.86]  [0.27]  [1.21] 
-0.23  0.10  -0.20  0.10  Long term debt dummy 
[2.74]**  [1.59]  [2.12]*  [1.45] 
8.79  -0.93  9.83  -0.74 
R&D 
[11.84]**  [1.17]  [11.83]**  [0.76] 
Industry fixed effects  Yes    Yes   
Firm fixed effects    Yes    Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.10  5.50  4.73  5.47  Constant 
[31.16]**  [18.39]**  [27.43]**  [16.71]** 
Observations  11924  11924  10991  10991 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.58  0.81  0.57  0.8 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           59 
Table 11. Tobit regression of log option grants per employee on past returns and measures of cash 
constraints. Regressions (1) and (2) use Tobit estimation with censoring at zero. All variables are defined 
as in Table 3. Regressions (1) includes year dummies, regression (2) includes year dummies and firm 
random effects. T-statistics use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for clustering at the 
firm level. 
 
     
  
Dependent variable: Log 
option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2) 
0.73  0.47  Stock return over previous two years 
[14.50]**  [17.55]** 
0.06  0.02 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[2.09]*  [1.32] 
0.35  0.21  Qt 
[13.39]**  [17.13]** 
0.03  -0.105  KZ4t-1 
[0.83]  [6.92]** 
2.67  1.78  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[8.25]**  [12.44]** 
-0.61  -0.68 
Interest burdent-1 
[3.72]**  [8.70]** 
-0.11  -0.21  Log sales 
[4.97]**  [14.87]** 
-0.44  -0.12  Long term debt dummy 
[4.28]**  [2.62]** 
7.92  3.09 
R&D 
[7.84]**  [10.39]** 
Firm random effects    Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
5.52  6.81  Constant 
[27.37]**  [56.45]** 
Observations  12898  12898 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table  12.  Regression  of log  option grants  per  employee  on  past  returns  and  measures  of  cash 
constraints using hand-collected data from 1995 to 2000.  All variables are defined as in Table 3. 
Regressions (1) and (2) use standard OLS estimation, regressions (3) and (4) use Tobit estimation with 
censoring at zero. All regressions include year dummies. Regression (1) includes industry fixed effects, 
regression (2) includes firm fixed effects, and regression (4) includes firm random effects. T-statistics use 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for clustering at the firm level in regressions (1) to (3). 
 
 
              
Panel A: Hand-collected data         
   Dependent Variable: Log Option Grants per Employee 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.74  0.79  1.09  0.96  Stock return over previous two years 
[6.49]**  [7.28]**  [6.96]**  [13.53]** 
0.05  0.20  0.10  0.17 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[0.72]  [3.24]**  [1.08]  [3.81]** 
0.21  0.04  0.38  0.13  Qt 
[4.69]**  [1.30]  [5.35]**  [4.96]** 
0.02  -0.087  0.166  0.002  KZ4t-1 
[0.40]  [1.88]  [2.44]*  [0.06] 
3.20  1.30  3.90  2.41  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[6.55]**  [2.68]**  [6.10]**  [7.90]** 
-0.73  -1.47  -1.14  -0.91 
Interest burdent-1 
[2.52]*  [4.28]**  [3.15]**  [4.22]** 
-0.02  -0.08  -0.08  -0.18  Log sales 
[0.33]  [0.82]  [1.64]  [8.65]** 
-0.19  0.34  -0.12  0.21  Long term debt dummy 
[0.81]  [1.57]  [0.41]  [1.59] 
5.64  1.41  8.58  4.85 
R&D 
[4.55]**  [1.24]  [5.55]**  [8.16]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes       
Firm fixed effects    Yes     
Firm random effects        Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4.92  5.34  4.36  5.63  Constant 
[12.61]**  [7.21]**  [9.29]**  [.] 
Observations  4208  4208  4208  4208 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.53  0.84  -  - 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         




              
Panel B: ExecuComp data         
   Dependent Variable: Log Option Grants per Employee 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.66  0.70  0.99  0.80  Stock return over previous two years 
[5.45]**  [6.28]**  [7.24]**  [12.02]** 
-0.02  0.21  0.13  0.12 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[0.29]  [3.51]**  [2.06]*  [2.95]** 
0.29  0.02  0.34  0.15  Qt 
[6.44]**  [0.52]  [7.93]**  [6.32]** 
0.03  -0.04  0.062  -0.047  KZ4t-1 
[0.64]  [0.73]  [1.30]  [1.77] 
2.58  0.81  3.35  2.26  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[6.41]**  [1.85]  [6.80]**  [7.91]** 
-0.22  -1.11  -0.45  -0.59 
Interest burdent-1 
[0.83]  [4.22]**  [1.58]  [3.39]** 
-0.09  0.04  -0.12  -0.17  Log sales 
[2.47]*  [0.38]  [3.43]**  [6.52]** 
-0.32  0.25  -0.22  0.01  Long term debt dummy 
[1.77]  [1.66]  [1.04]  [0.10] 
2.28  -2.14  4.29  2.07 
R&D 
[1.49]  [1.70]  [2.92]**  [4.38]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes       
Firm fixed effects    Yes     
Firm random effects        Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
6.09  5.29  5.57  6.31  Constant 
[18.83]**  [7.51]**  [15.87]**  [28.89]** 
Observations  3146  3146  3146  3146 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.58  0.84  -  - 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
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Table 13. Regression of log option grants per employee on past returns, earnings manipulation, and 
measures  of  cash  constraints.  Manipulator  is  a  dummy  variable  taking  a  value  of  one  if  a  firm’s 
discretionary accruals are in the top 10% of all firm-years in our sample. Three different measures of 
discretionary accruals are calculated as residuals from industry-year regressions of normalized accruals on 
normalized sales growth. Balance sheet discretionary accruals (regressions (1) and (2)) are calculated as 
in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998 a,b). Cash flow statement discretionary total accruals (regressions (3) 
and (4)) and cash flow statement discretionary operating accruals (regressions (5) and (6)) are calculated 
as in Hribar and Collins (2001). Appendix A describes the calculations in detail. All other variables are 
defined as in Table 3. Regressions (1), (3), and (5) include year dummies and 3-digit SIC dummies, 
regressions  (2),  (4),  and  (6)  include  year  dummies  and  firm  fixed  effects.  T-statistics  use 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
                   
   Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
0.13  0.14          Manipulator - balance sheet 
discretionary current accruals  [2.80]**  [3.43]**         
    0.16  0.13      Manipulator - cash flow statement 
discretionary total accruals      [3.40]**  [3.26]**     
        0.23  0.23  Manipulator - cash flow statement 
discretionary operating accruals              [3.07]**  [3.55]** 
0.52  0.41  0.52  0.41  0.48  0.32  Stock return over previous two years 
[11.17]**  [8.86]**  [11.50]**  [9.23]**  [6.57]**  [3.73]** 
-0.02  0.02  -0.02  0.03  -0.07  -0.02 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[0.93]  [0.90]  [0.76]  [1.25]  [2.30]*  [0.62] 
0.30  0.14  0.30  0.14  0.33  0.15  Qt 
[13.49]**  [7.61]**  [13.68]**  [7.91]**  [11.66]**  [5.47]** 
0.00  -0.09  0.00  -0.09  -0.05  -0.11  KZ4t-1 
[0.16]  [3.74]**  [0.05]  [3.62]**  [1.58]  [2.78]** 
2.27  0.98  2.27  0.95  2.15  0.84  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[9.88]**  [4.53]**  [9.97]**  [4.48]**  [7.22]**  [2.49]* 
-0.57  -0.85  -0.57  -0.85  -0.62  -0.89 
Interest burdent-1 
[4.27]**  [6.94]**  [4.24]**  [7.04]**  [3.54]**  [4.32]** 
-0.10  -0.06  -0.09  -0.06  -0.14  -0.08  Log sales 
[5.00]**  [1.61]  [4.80]**  [1.56]  [5.35]**  [1.46] 
-0.26  0.07  -0.27  0.07  -0.20  0.15  Long term debt dummy 
[3.27]**  [1.11]  [3.34]**  [1.09]  [2.09]*  [2.03]* 
3.81  -2.00  3.85  -1.94  2.81  -2.72 
R&D 
[4.12]**  [2.63]**  [4.18]**  [2.57]*  [2.31]*  [3.09]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Firm fixed effects    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.88  6.07  5.86  6.06  6.29  6.41  Constant 
[35.12]**  [22.62]**  [34.63]**  [23.08]**  [28.98]**  [17.55]** 
Observations  11710  11710  12080  12080  5551  5551 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.6  0.83  0.6  0.83  0.65  0.86 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
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Table 14. Regression of log option grants per employee on past returns, insider trading, earnings 
manipulation, and measures of cash constraints. Buying (selling) managers is a dummy variable taking 
on a value of one if the average share purchases by a firm’s management are in the top (bottom) 20% of 
all firm-years. Managerial share purchases are calculated as in Jenter (2005).  The manipulator variables 
indicating earnings management are defined as in Table 13. All other variables are defined as in Table 3. 
Regressions (1), (3), and (5) include year dummies and 3-digit SIC dummies, regressions (2), (4), and (6) 
include year dummies and firm fixed effects. T-statistics use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and 
allow for clustering at the firm level. 
 
             
   Dependent variable: Log option grants per employee 
Independent variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Buying managers  -0.18  -0.04  -0.17  -0.04  -0.19  -0.02 
  [4.87]**  [1.20]  [4.79]**  [1.29]  [3.80]**  [0.30] 
Selling managers  0.11  -0.05  0.11  -0.05  0.19  -0.01 
   [2.93]**  [1.47]  [2.97]**  [1.65]  [3.27]**  [0.16] 
0.10  0.14          Manipulator - balance sheet 
discretionary current accruals  [2.03]*  [3.36]**         
    0.10  0.11      Manipulator - cash flow statement 
discretionary total accruals      [2.18]*  [2.83]**     
        0.20  0.18  Manipulator - cash flow statement 
discretionary operating accruals              [2.65]**  [2.89]** 
0.52  0.44  0.52  0.44  0.50  0.40  Stock return over previous two years 
[13.33]**  [12.22]**  [13.72]**  [12.55]**  [9.42]**  [8.16]** 
-0.05  0.02  -0.04  0.03  -0.10  -0.01 
Contemporaneous stock return 
[1.99]*  [0.90]  [1.70]  [1.21]  [2.74]**  [0.25] 
0.30  0.13  0.29  0.13  0.31  0.12  Qt 
[13.04]**  [7.53]**  [13.19]**  [7.93]**  [10.62]**  [4.83]** 
-0.01  -0.084  -0.002  -0.08  -0.054  -0.09  KZ4t-1 
[0.21]  [3.39]**  [0.07]  [3.28]**  [1.76]  [2.21]* 
2.16  0.85  2.17  0.82  2.05  0.60  Cash flow shortfallt-1 
[9.08]**  [3.72]**  [9.21]**  [3.72]**  [6.62]**  [1.68] 
-0.55  -0.91  -0.55  -0.92  -0.57  -0.95 
Interest burdent-1 
[3.95]**  [7.10]**  [3.97]**  [7.24]**  [3.20]**  [4.65]** 
-0.09  -0.05  -0.09  -0.04  -0.13  -0.08  Log sales 
[4.65]**  [1.16]  [4.44]**  [1.08]  [5.01]**  [1.38] 
-0.26  0.07  -0.27  0.07  -0.20  0.11  Long term debt dummy 
[3.18]**  [1.03]  [3.31]**  [1.02]  [1.98]*  [1.44] 
3.84  -1.93  3.89  -1.87  2.80  -2.34 
R&D 
[3.97]**  [2.50]*  [4.04]**  [2.45]*  [2.22]*  [2.45]* 
Industry fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Firm fixed effects    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
5.93  6.04  5.91  6.01  6.28  6.42  Constant 
[35.54]**  [21.27]**  [35.29]**  [21.56]**  [28.90]**  [16.78]** 
Observations  10560  10560  10898  10898  4996  4996 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.6  0.84  0.6  0.83  0.65  0.86 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
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Table 15. Share repurchases as a function of employee option grants. Option grants are the dollar 
value of options granted to non-executive employees divided by the average number of employees during 
a firm year. Quintile cutoff points are calculated using the entire pooled sample. For Panel A, share 
repurchases are calculated from Compustat as the “Purchases of Common and Preferred Stock” (data item 
115) less any decrease in the par value of preferred stock (data item 130). For Panel B, share repurchases 
are calculated as minus the change in the number of shares outstanding from CRSP, adjusted for both 




                 
Panel A: Share repurchases from Compustat in the full sample 1992-2003 
A1: Percentage of firm years with positive share repurchases 
  Option grant quintile  Percentage repurchasers  Observations 
  1  46%  2478 
  2  55%  2477 
  3  58%  2427 
  4  56%  2403 
   5  51%  2252 
A2: Percentage of outstanding shares repurchased during the year for       
repurchasing firms 
   Option grant quintile  Mean  Median  Observations 
  1  2.81%  1.58%  1138 
  2  2.87%  1.54%  1364 
  3  3.11%  1.85%  1417 
  4  3.12%  1.76%  1356 
   5  2.61%  1.61%  1147 
           
                 
Panel B: Share repurchases from CRSP adjusted for option exercises and 
executive stock grants in the hand-collected subsample 1995-2000 
B1: Percentage of firm years with positive share repurchases 
  Option grant quintile  Percentage repurchasers  Observations 
  1  45%  806 
  2  60%  818 
  3  60%  818 
  4  56%  820 
   5  38%  819 
B2: Percentage of outstanding shares repurchased during the year for 
repurchasing firms 
   Option grant quintile  Mean  Median  Observations 
  1  2.89%  1.19%  363 
  2  3.32%  1.65%  488 
  3  3.44%  2.07%  488 
  4  3.83%  2.05%  456 
   5  3.85%  1.63%  310 
 
 